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ABSTRACT 
SECURITY SYSTEMS BASED ON GAUSSIAN INTEGERS: ANALYSIS OF 






Many security algorithms currently in use rely heavily on integer arithmetic modulo 
prime numbers. Gaussian integers can be used with most security algorithms that are 
formulated for real integers. The aim of this work is to study the benefits of common 
security protocols with Gaussian integers. Although the main contribution of this work is 
to analyze and improve the application of Gaussian integers for various public key (PK) 
algorithms, Gaussian integers were studied in the context of image watermarking as well. 
 The significant benefits of the application of Gaussian integers become apparent 
when they are used with Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) based PK algorithms. In 
order to quantify the complexity of the Gaussian integer DLP, it is reduced to two other 
well known problems: DLP for Lucas sequences and the real integer DLP. Additionally, 
a novel exponentiation algorithm for Gaussian integers, called Lucas sequence 
Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG) is introduced and its performance assessed, 
both analytically and experimentally. The LSEG achieves about 35% theoretical 
improvement in CPU time over real integer exponentiation. Under an implementation 
with the GMP 5.0.1 library, it outperformed the GMP’s "mpz_powm" function (the 
particularly efficient modular exponentiation function that comes with the GMP library) 
by 40% for bit sizes 1000-4000, because of low overhead associated with LSEG. Further 
improvements to real execution time can be easily achieved on multiprocessor or 
multicore platforms. In fact, over 50% improvement is achieved with a parallelized 
implementation of LSEG. All the mentioned improvements do not require any special 
hardware or software and are easy to implement. Furthermore, an efficient way for 
finding generators for DLP based PK algorithms with Gaussian integers is presented. 
In addition to DLP based PK algorithms, applications of Gaussian integers for 
factoring-based PK cryptosystems are considered. Unfortunately, the advantages of 
Gaussian integers for these algorithms are not as clear because the extended order of 
Gaussian integers does not directly come into play. Nevertheless, this dissertation 
describes the Extended Square Root algorithm for Gaussian integers used to extend the 
Rabin Cryptography algorithm into the field of Gaussian integers. The extended Rabin 
Cryptography algorithm with Gaussian integers allows using fewer preset bits that are 
required by the algorithm to guard against various attacks. Additionally, the extension of 
RSA into the domain of Gaussian integers is analyzed. The extended RSA algorithm 
could add security only if breaking the original RSA is not as hard as factoring. Even in 
this case, it is not clear whether the extended algorithm would increase security. 
Finally, the randomness property of the Gaussian integer exponentiation is 
utilized to derive a novel algorithm to rearrange the image pixels to be used for image 
watermarking. The new algorithm is more efficient than the one currently used and it 
provides a degree of cryptoimmunity. The proposed method can be used to enhance most 
picture watermarking algorithms. 
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The history of cryptography dates back thousands of years. Over most of this time, it has 
been a history of symmetric cryptography. It appeared obvious that the only way for 
several parties to communicate securely is to share a secret method or a key. It seemed 
that there is no other way because the recipient must have an advantage over 
eavesdropper. Key exchange is the weakest link of symmetric cryptography. The 
challenge of exchanging secret keys securely is magnified when there are many parties 
that need to communicate. 
The revolution in cryptography happened in 1970s when Public Key or 
asymmetric cryptography was introduced. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman published a 
revolutionary paper titled "New Directions in Cryptography" [26], where they introduced 
the concepts of Public Key or asymmetric cryptography. In addition, they introduced the 
method of exchanging keys known as Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol. The 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol relies on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm 
problem. Similar techniques were invented earlier by James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks, and 
Malcolm Williamson at GCHQ but were kept secret until the late 1990s. After this, many 
new Public Key algorithm and techniques were introduced. Most notable of these are 
RSA, Rabin, ElGamal and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
In 1977, the RSA algorithm was by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman at 





large primes. RSA was a great success and currently is the most commonly used Public 
Key Encryption algorithm. 
In 1979, M. O. Rabin introduced a Rabin Cryptosystem, which, as RSA, is based 
on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. Rabin Cryptosystem has some notable 
advantages over RSA; however, it is not as widely used as RSA. 
In 1984, Taher ElGamal introduced the ElGamal algorithm. As the Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange protocol, it is using the difficulty of the discrete logarithm 
problem. As RSA, ElGamal is currently widely used. 
In 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor S. Miller introduced Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC). It uses a special algebraic structure called elliptic curves over finite 
group. ECC is very promising technique because the discrete logarithm problem over 
elliptic curves is more difficult than the same problem over integers. This allows for 
smaller keys which, in turn, increase the efficiency. ECC has been recommended by the 
NSA and seem to have a very bright future. 
Despite apparent advantages of Public Key cryptography, it is not about to replace 
symmetric cryptography. There are many reasons to use symmetric cryptography. The 
most important one is that all known Public Key algorithms are not nearly as efficient as 
symmetric cryptography algorithms. For instance, asymmetric algorithms may work well 
to encrypt emails because a delay of fraction of a second for email is not noticeable. 
However, for real time delay sensitive applications like Voice over IP (VOIP) or Virtual 
Private Networks (VPN) this kind of delay is unacceptable. The practical solution for this 
is to use a Private Key algorithm to distribute a symmetric key and use the symmetric key 
to encrypt and decrypt the messages. For example, the contemporary VPN protocols use 
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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol (asymmetric) to exchange Triple DES 
(symmetric protocol) keys. 
Efficiency of Public Key algorithms is directly tied to the size of the key. As 
computing power grows, the keys have to grow also. For example, 512-bit keys for RSA 
were considered sufficiently secure. At present, even 1024 bit keys are sometimes 
considered potentially weak. Most companies and individuals use 2048 bit keys for RSA 
now. 
One of the directions of contemporary cryptography research is extending tried-
and-true Public Key Cryptography algorithms such as RSA, ElGamal and Rabin into 
well-studied cyclical groups. The aim is to improve the security of the algorithms by 
introducing more complexity. Improved security would allow for use of smaller keys, in 
turn, improving efficiency. One difficulty is that with increased complexity overhead is 
introduced that may undermine any efficiency improvements. Another difficulty is that as 
the algorithms become more complex it becomes harder to assess their security.  
In this dissertation, the use of Gaussian integers as the underlying field for RSA, 
ElGamal and Rabin algorithms is studied. The extension of the Rabin algorithm into the 
field of Gaussian integers is introduced. 
Gaussian integers are complex numbers with integers as both real and imaginary 
part. Carl Friedrich Gauss introduced the ring of Gaussian integers in 1829 – 1831. He 
formulated many properties of Gaussian integers like properties of factorization and the 
concept of Gaussian Prime. Gauss used them as a tool to prove some theoretical results. 
The properties of Gaussian integers and Gaussian Primes are well known and formulated 
so they are going to be used as facts. 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Many security algorithms currently in use rely heavily on integer arithmetic modulo 
prime numbers. Gaussian integers can be used with most security algorithms that are 
formulated for real integers. The aim of this work is to study the benefits of common 
security protocols with Gaussian integers. Although the main contribution of this work is 
to analyze and improve the application of Gaussian integers for various public key (PK) 
algorithms, Gaussian integers were studied in the context of image watermarking as well. 
 Among the most widely used PK algorithms are RSA, Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange, ElGamal, and Rabin [58] PK algorithms. Unfortunately, in order to provide a 
required degree of cryptoimmunity, the keys must be very large. Large keys mean lower 
speed of encryption/decryption/authentication. One of the ways to increase speed is to 
consider more complicated fields with larger cyclic groups, e.g., Gaussian integers. Most 
mainstream PKC algorithms fall into two categories: Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP) 
based (e.g., ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman key exchange) and integer factoring based (RSA 
or Rabin). Gaussian integers can be successfully used with all the PK algorithms that are 
formulated for real integers and this work explores the application of Gaussian integers 
for both types of PK algorithms.  
The Gaussian integer modulo prime cyclic group order is much larger then the 
real integer modulo prime order for the same prime. However, larger order does not 
guarantee increased security nor does it mean that the extended PK algorithms would be 
more efficient. The security depends on the complexity of the underlying DLP. 
Unfortunately, assessing complexity of such DLP is usually very hard. One way to do it 
is to reduce the Gaussian integer DLP to another well known problem: DLP for Lucas 
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sequences, which is about twice as hard as the real integer DLP for the same prime. This 
reduction is described in Chapter 2. Another challenge was to perform the exponentiation 
of Gaussian integers faster than the exponentiation of real integers. This goal was 
achieved with a novel exponentiation algorithm for Gaussian integers, which called 
Lucas sequence Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG). The performance of LSEG 
is assesed both analytically and experimentally. The LSEG achieves about 35% 
theoretical improvement in CPU time over real integer exponentiation. Under an 
implementation with the GMP 5.0.1 library it outperformed the GMP’s "mpz_powm" 
function (the particularly efficient modular exponentiation function that comes with the 
GMP library) by 40% for bit sizes 1000-4000, because of low overhead associated with  
LSEG. Further improvements to real execution time can be easily achived on 
multiprocessor or multicore platforms with parallelizing certain steps in LSEG. All the 
mentioned improvements do not require any special hardware or software and are easy to 
implement. Additionally, an efficient way for finding generators is proposed. It would be 
useful for real-world implementations of DLP based PK algorithms with Gaussian 
integers. 
In addition to DLP based PK algorithms, the applications of Gaussian integers for 
factoring-based PK cryptosystems are considered. Unfortunately, the advantages of 
Gaussian integers for these algorithms are not as clear, because the extended order of 
Gaussian integers does not directly come into play. Nevertheless, the Extended Square 
Root algorithm for Gaussian integers is derived and its validity is proven. Using this 
algorithm, Rabin Cryptography algorithm was extended into the field of Gaussian 
integers. The resulting Extended Rabin Cryptography algorithm allows using fewer 
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preset bits that are required by the algorithm to guard against various attacks. 
Additionally, the extension of RSA into the domain of Gaussian integers is analyzed in-
depth. The analysis, published in [49], yielded several interesting results, e.g., that a 
certain type of Gaussian primes does not offer any advantages over real primes. 
Finally, the randomness property of the Gaussian integer exponentiation is 
utilized to derive a novel algorithm to rearrange the image pixels to be used for image 
watermarking. Currently many image watermarking techniques use Arnold’s cat map to 
rearrange the image pixels as a part of the watermarking algorithm. In the rearrangement 
step, Arnold’s cat map can be replaced with the new algorithm based on Gaussian 
integers, which has the advantages of increased speed and security. Moreover, the new 
algorithm can provide a degree of cryptoimmunity to image watermarking. The proposed 
method can be used with most picture watermarking algorithms to enhance them.  
The techniques and theoretical framework developed and presented in this 
dissertation offer some interesting avenues for further research. Potential uses include 
new cryptography algorithms, primality testing, steganography and cryptanalysis of the 
existing algorithms.   
 
 
1.2 Survey of References 
In 1979, M. O. Rabin in his paper “Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as 
Intractable as Factorization”, [58], introduced a new cryptosystem, later called the Rabin 
Cryptosystem. The Rabin Cryptosystem, as the RSA, is based on the difficulty of 
factoring large numbers. Rabin Cryptosystem has some notable advantages over the 
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RSA, mainly faster encryption. The encryption with Rabin is very simple. If m is a 
message and n=pq is a product of two large primes, then the ciphertext c is c=m2 mod n. 
To decrypt the message, the reverse operation is needed, namely, the receiver has to take 
a square root of c mod n. Rabin showed that the square root mod n operation is equivalent 
to factoring of n. This means that the code can only be broken if the adversary can factor 
n. Thus the Rabin Cryptosystem is proven as secure as factorization.  
As other public key cryptosystems, the Rabin Cryptosystem can be used to 
digitally sign documents. The method for signing documents using public key 
cryptosystems was first described in the seminal paper by R. L. Rivest. A. Shamir, and L. 
Adleman: “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems”, 
[59], where the authors introduced the concept of digital signatures.  
In 1985, W. Alexi, B. Chor, O. Goldreich and C. P. Schnorr published 
“RSA/Rabin Functions: Certain Parts are As Hard As the Whole”, [4], where they prove 
that, if one is able to predict the least significant bit of the number m2 mod n (Rabin) or 
the me mod n (RSA) with a probability greater than ½, then it is possible to invert the 
function. This result is important for algorithms that use Rabin or RSA for random 
number generators.  
 Another notable paper on the subject of Rabin algorithm signatures security is 
“Proving Tight Security for Standard Rabin-Williams Signatures”, [13], by Daniel J. 
Bernstein. In this paper, the author proves that any generic attack on standard Rabin 
signatures could be converted into the factorization algorithm, thus proving the security 
of Rabin signatures. 
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 In 2001, A. N. El-Kassar, M. Rizk, N. Mirza, and Y.A. Awad, in a paper titled 
“ElGamal Public-Key Cryptosystem in the Domain of Gaussian Integers” [27] introduced 
an extension of the ElGamal algorithm into the field of Gaussian integers. The extension 
deals with Gaussian integers modulo real Gaussian Primes (primes : mod 4 3p p = ). The 
proposed cryptosystem is, presumably, more secure because the order of a Gaussian 
Prime generator is p2-1 as opposed to p for real integers. This is potentially a huge 
advantage because this allows for the use of smaller primes, which dramatically improves 
the efficiency.  
In 2002, H. Elkamchouchi, K. Elshenawy and H. Shaban introduced the extension 
of the RSA algorithm to the field of Gaussian integers in their paper “Extended RSA 
Cryptosystem and Digital Signature Schemes in the Domain of Gaussian Integers” [30].  
As opposed to the ElGamal extension, the domain of Gaussian Primes is not restricted. 
Consequently, the strength of this algorithm is based on Gaussian integer factoring as 
opposed to real integer factoring. The security of the proposed cryptosystem was not 
proven in this paper. 
In 2004, A. N. El-Kassar, R. A. Haraty and Y.A. Awad in their paper "Modified 
RSA in the Domains of Gaussian Integers and Polynomials Over Finite Fields” [28] 
formulated the extension of RSA into the domain of Gaussian integer modulo real primes 
similar to the domain in [27]. This paper describes a special case of the extended RSA 
algorithm described in [30].  
In 2004, Ramzi A. Haraty, A. N. El-Kassar and Hadi Otrok in their paper "A 
Comparative Study of RSA based Cryptographic Algorithms” [35] tested the reliability 
and security of several RSA extensions described in [28]. The authors found that all 
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algorithms tested to be reliable and probably secure. The running time of Gaussian RSA 
was similar to the original RSA. This paper does not prove the security of Gaussian 
integer RSA.  
In 2004, Ramzi A. Haraty, Hadi Otrok and A. N. El-Kassar in their paper "A 
Comparative Study of ElGamal Based Cryptographic Algorithms" [36]  tested the 
reliability and security of several extensions of the ElGamal algorithm. Among the 
algorithms tested, was an extension of ElGamal into the field of Gaussian integers 
described in [27]. To test the security the Baby-step Giant-step algorithm was used. The 
authors found that the ElGamal algorithm with Gaussian integers was probably stronger 
than the original, because the discrete logarithm took for Gaussian integers took twice as 
long to compute. By no means is this a proof that it is strong, however, it is an indication 
that it could be stronger than the original. 
The paper by Ramzi A. Haraty, Hadi Otrok and A. N. El-Kassar "Attacking 
ElGamal Based Cryptographic Algorithms Using Pollard's Rho Algorithm" [38] is very 
similar to [36]. Here, to test the security the authors enhanced the Pollard's Rho algorithm 
to work with Gaussian integers (the original Pollard's Rho algorithm works with real 
integers). All the analysis and results are essentially the same as in [36]. 
In 2005, Boris S. Verkhovsky and A. Mutovic in their paper "Primality Testing 
Algorithm Using Pythagorean Integers" [66]  introduced a novel use for Gaussian 
integers, namely, primality testing. The algorithms presented improve the performance of 
the Fermat’s original primality test. They are able to detect Carmichael numbers 
(undetectable with the original Fermat’s test) with high probability. The primality test 
introduced in [67] uses quaternions to further improve the probability of detecting 
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Carmichael numbers. The theory and techniques that will be presented in this 
dissertation, together with other ideas presented by Dr. Boris S. Verkhovsky, may allow 
an improvement of the test introduced in [66].  The primality testing with Gaussian 
integers and their variants will not be in the scope of this dissertation, but illustrates the 
practical value of the topic to be explored. 
The paper by Ramzi A. Haraty, A. N. El-Kassar and B. Shibaro "A Comparative 
Study of RSA Based Digital Signature Algorithms" [37] is very similar to [35]. As 
opposed to encryption and decryption in [35], this paper deals with extended RSA digital 
signature schemes. For the most part, it is a report on experiments ran by the authors.  
The paper by Peter Smith “LUC Public Key Encryption: a Secure Alternative to 
RSA” [62], published in 1993, describes the first cryptosystem that is based on Lucas 
sequences, called LUC. LUC uses calculation of Lucas functions as an alternative to real 
integer exponentiation. The paper claims that “while Lucas functions are somewhat more 
complex mathematically than exponentiation, they produce superior ciphers. “ 
Another paper by Peter Smith “Cryptography Without Exponentiation” [63], 
published in 1994, introduced three more algorithms based on Lucas sequences: a Lucas-
function ElGamal PK encryption, a Lucas-function ElGamal digital signature, and a key 
exchange algorithm called LUCDIF (essentially, LUCDIF is the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange protocol over Lucas sequences).  All three algorithms are based on the 
difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm problem for Lucas functions. The author claims that 
the proposed cryptosystems are stronger, because they are not based on exponentiation 




The paper by Chi-Sung Laih, Fu-Kuan Tu and Wen-Chung Tai “On the Security 
of the Lucas Function” [51], published in 1995, discusses the security of Discrete 
Logarithms for Lucas sequences. The authors raised doubts about the hypothesis that the 
security of the Lucas function is cryptographically stronger than or at least as strong as 
the security of the exponentiation function. They also show that the security of the Lucas 
function is polynomial-time equivalent to the generalized discrete logarithm problems.  
The paper by Arjen K. Lenstra, Daniel Bleichenbacher and Wieb Bosma “Some 
Remarks on Lucas-Based Cryptosystems” [52], published in 1995, discusses the security 
of all Lucas sequence-based cryptosystems. For LUC it describes a chosen ciphertext 
attack, as a result proving that LUC is not stronger than RSA. Additionally, a 
subexponential attack on Discrete Logarithm for Lucas sequences is described.  
The computation of Lucas sequences is a very important subject of this 
dissertation. The first significant paper was published on the subject in 1995 by S.M. Yen 
and C.S. Laih “Fast Algorithms for LUC Digital Signature Computation” [74]. The paper 
describes two efficient algorithms to compute Lucas sequences for LUC cryptographic 
algorithms. The two algorithms are analogous to square-multiply algorithms for real 
integers. Logical extensions of the algorithms published in [74] is represented by the 
work by C.S. Laih and S.Y. Chiou “An Efficient Algorithm for Computing the Luc 
Chain” first published in 1995 ([18]) and later published again in [19]. It describes an 
improvement to  [74] that is achieved by using addition chains for LUC exponentiation. 
Another significant paper that introduces improvements of  [74] by using addition chains 
is the paper by C.T. Wang, C.C. Chang, and C.H. Lin “A Method for Computing Lucas 
Sequences” published in 1999 [68]. Incidentally, quite a few papers have been published 
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on this subject recently, namely [5-9, 56, 57], that do not describe any improvements to 
[68].   
The LUC cryptosystem is based on one of the two Lucas sequences, namely V. 
The computation of both Lucas “sister” sequences is of particular interest. Such an 
algorithm was published in 1996 in the paper “Efficient Computation of Full Lucas 
Sequences" by M. Joye and J. J. Quisquater. The improved algorithm was published in 
[47]. It is utilized as an alternative to the Gaussian integer exponentiation. 
For this discussion, the complexity of the multiplication operation is very 
important. Depending on the integer size, different multiplication methods are 
appropriate. For small bit sizes the naïve multiplication method [44] with complexity of 
 is most efficient. For larger bit sizes the Karatsuba-Ofman [43] multiplication 
algorithm is universally used. As bit sizes increase, multiple levels of the k-way Toom-
Cook multiplication ([21],[44]) could be applied. For extremely large bit sizes, 
algorithms based on Fast Fourier transforms (FFT) such as the Schönhage–Strassen 
algorithm ([60]) and Fürer's algorithm ([31]) become practical. Since FFT algorithms are 
used for very large bit sizes, the FFT algorithms will not be considered in the subsequent 
discussion.  
2( )nΘ
Another important topic is the time complexity of modular reduction. The 
performance relative to multiplication is of particular interest. The “mod” division 
operation is much slower than multiplication. For small to moderate integer sizes, the 
divide-and-conquer algorithm [16] is commonly used for modular division. However, for 
efficient modular exponentiation algorithms the costly mod operation is replaced with the 
Montgomery reduction or REDC() operation ([55]), because it is much more efficient 
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([14]). There are quite a few implementation variations for Montgomery reduction 
analyzed in [46] and [17]. Moreover, there are many papers published with marginal 
improvements to the Montgomery reduction method, most of them through low level 
implementations and specialized hardware (e.g., [1, 11, 20, 23, 29, 39, 71]). The 
performance of the reduction algorithms (either modular division or Montgomery REDC) 
relative to multiplication is of interest in this discussion. In particular, the range from one 
to four multiplications in which all of the contemporary reduction implementations fall is 
considered. 
Steganography is a process of hiding information in a medium in such a manner 
that no one except the anticipated recipient knows of its existence ([61]). A notable 
application of steganography is watermarking of digital images, which is a useful tool for 
identifying the source, creator, owner, distributor, or authorized consumer of a document 
or an image. A way to apply Gaussian integers for image watermarking is described in 
this dissertation. There are many innovative watermarking algorithms and many more get 
published every day (such as recently published [3, 41, 53, 70] ). In many image 
watermarking algorithms, for example in [24, 69, 72, 73], it is required to rearrange the 
pixels as a part of the watermarking process. An algorithm that uses Gaussian integers for 
the rearrangement step is presented in  [48]. 
Gaussian integers and Gaussian primes have a long history and have been studied 
as a mathematical subject. However, only recently they have been used to extend popular 
Public Key cryptography algorithms. The published papers directly related to the 
proposed topic are [27, 28, 30, 35, 36, 38]. The two most common Public Key 
cryptography algorithms RSA and ElGamal have been extended into the field of 
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Gaussian integers ([30] and [27]). An extension of another classic cryptography 
algorithm, Rabin, is presented in this dissertation. Most of the papers published state that 
the extended cryptosystems have advantages over the corresponding real integer 
algorithms. However, none of them prove or carefully analyze these statements. This 
dissertation would close many of the gaps in the subject. 
 
 
1.3 Overview of Gaussian Integers, Notation and Definitions 
Gaussian integer is a complex number a+bi where both a and b are integers: 
 
[ ] { : , }Z i a bi a b= + ∈Z  (1.1)
 
Gaussian integers, with ordinary addition and multiplication of complex numbers, form 
an integral domain, usually written as Z[i].  
In this dissertation, Gaussian integers are denoted with capital letters and real 
integers with lower case letters. Also, vector notation for Gaussian integers is used (i.e., 
G=(a,b)  is equivalent to G=a+bi ). 
 The multiplication of Gaussian integers is a case of complex number 
multiplication. If G=(a,b) and H=(c,d), then 
 





2 2 2 2( )( ) (2 ) ( , 2G a bi a bi a b i ab a b ab= + + = − + = − 2 )  (1.3)
 
   
It takes three integer multiplications to multiply two Gaussian integers: 
Algorithm 1.3.1 Multiplication of two Gaussian integers
Given: ( , ,  Gaussian integers )a b ( , )c d
Find: Gaussian integer ( , ) ( , )( , )x y a b c d=  
 
1 ( )(v a b c d );= + +  (1.4)
 
2 ;v ac=  (1.5)
 
3v bd=  (1.6)
 
2 3x v v= −  (1.7)
 




It takes only two integer multiplications to square a Gaussian integer: 
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Algorithm 1.3.2 Squaring of two Gaussian integers 
Given: ( ,  Gaussian integer )a b
Find: Gaussian integer 2( , ) ( , )x y a b=  
Return ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )2, , ,x y a b a b a b ab ab= = + − +  
 
The addition of Gaussian integers is a case of complex number addition. If 
G=(a,b) and H=(c,d), then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,G H a bi c di a c i b d a c b d+ = + + + = + + + = + + )  (1.9)
 
The norm of a Gaussian integer is the natural number defined as  
2 2| | | | | ( , ) |G a bi a b a b= + = = +  (1.10)
 
It is known that GH G H=  (by the properties of complex numbers). 
All real integers are also Gaussian integers. The multiplication of a Gaussian 
integer by a real number is a case of the Gaussian integer multiplication: 
If G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer and h is a real integer, then: 
 






( )( 0) ( , )( ,0) ( ,Gh a bi h i a b h ah bh= + + ⋅ = =  (1.12)
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All real primes can be divided into two subgroups: primes p: p mod 4 = 3 and 
primes p: p mod 4 = 1. The primes p: p mod 4 = 3 will be referred to as Blum primes and 
primes p: p mod 4 = 1 as non-Blum primes. 
The prime elements of Z[i] are also known as Gaussian primes. If P is a Gaussian 
prime it cannot be represented as a product of non-unit Gaussian integers. The unit 
Gaussian integers are 1,-1, i and –i. Real prime numbers p: p mod 4 =3 are also Gaussian 
primes. Real prime numbers p: p mod 4 = 1 are not Gaussian primes since they can be 
represented as a sum of squares (according to the Fermat's theorem on sums of two 
squares) and, consequently, as a product of two Gaussian integers. For instance, 
 2 25 2 1 (2 )(2 )i i= + = + −
 Gaussian primes can be divided into two subgroups. One subgroup consists of 
primes P=(p,0), where p is a real prime and p mod 4=3 or  a real Blum prime. The second 
subgroup consists of primes P=(a,b) where |P| is a real prime and |P| mod 4=1. The 
Gaussian primes P=(p,0) will be referred as Blum Gaussian primes and the Gaussian 
primes P=(a,b) where |P| is a real prime will be referred as non-Blum Gaussian primes. 
 The division of Gaussian integers in this dissertation will be denoted as “DIV”. It 
is analogous to integer division (commonly referred to as “div”). “DIV” operation may be 
defined in several ways. The most common two ways to define it is presented below. If 
G=(a,b) and H=(c,d) are Gaussian integers , then  can be defined as:  DIV G H
1)  
 DIV 
| | | |
ac bd bc adG H i
H H
⎢ ⎥ ⎢+ −
= +
⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥







 DIV round round
| | | |
ac bd bc adG H
H H
⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ −















⎧ + ≥⎢ ⎥⎪⎣ ⎦= ⎨
− <⎡ ⎤⎪⎢ ⎥⎩  (1.15)
 
Modular congruence is defined over Gaussian integers in the similar way it is defined for 
real integers. If G=(a,b) and H=(c,d) are Gaussian integers then  
 
( ) MOD  DIV G H G H G= − H  (1.16)
 
To differentiate Gaussian modulo operation from real integer modulo operation the 
notation “MOD” will be used to represent Gaussian modulo operation and “mod” will be 
used for real integer modulo operation.  
Modular congruencies for Gaussian integers have similar properties as modular 
congruencies for real integers. However, there is an important difference: the residues 
modulo Gaussian primes are not unique. In fact, if MOD A B C≡  then , 
 and . Moreover, different ways to define division lead 
to different outcomes of Gaussian modulo operation. Regardless of the way the division 
is defined all the properties of modulo operation hold. When used for cryptography, the 
MOD A Bi C≡
 MOD A Bi≡ − C MOD A B C≡ −
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non-unique outcomes of modulo operation present a problem. However, with consistent 
definitions of division this problem is overcome. 
The G MOD H operation can be greatly simplified when H=(c,0) (or real integer). 
This operation will be defined as follows: 
      





where G=(a,b) and H=(c,0) are Gaussian integers;  and  are regular real 
integer “mod” operations. This definition is consistent with the definition of modulo 
operation for Gaussian integers. Note the same “mod” notation is used to represent real 
integer modulo real integer operation and Gaussian integer modulo real integer operation. 
This does not cause inconsistencies because the real integer modulo operation can be 
looked at as a special case of Gaussian integer modulo real integer operation. If G=(a,0) 
and H=(c,0) are Gaussian integers and e=a mod c is a real integer, then  
moda modb
 
 MOD ( ,0) mod ( ,0) modG H a c e a c= = ⇔  (1.18)
 
Below the formal definitions for modular operation on Gaussian integers are presented. 
Definition 1.3.1  MOD Operation on Gaussian integers
If  G and H are Gaussian integer, then  
( ) MOD  DIV G H G H G= − H  (1.19)
Definition 1.3.2  mod Operation on Gaussian integers
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If  G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer c is a real integer, then  
 
mod ( , ) mod ( mod , mod )G c a b c a c b= = c  (1.20)
 
Note that Blum Gaussian primes are real primes so Definition 1.3.2 also applies. 
 The order for Gaussian integers is defined in the some way it is defined for real 
integers. Below is the formal definition of the order: 
Definition 1.3.3  Order of a Gaussian integers 
If  H is a Gaussian integer, P is a Gaussian prime,  k is a real integer, and k > 1, then k  is 
referred to as the order of H (or ord(H) = k  MOD P)  if Hk+1=H (MOD P) and there is 
no such . :1  and  MOD  mm m k H H P< < =
 
If the Gaussian primes are restricted to Blum Gaussian primes, it is possible to define the 
order in terms of “mod” operation: 
Definition 1.3.4  Order of a Blum Gaussian integers 
If  H is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum Gaussian prime, k is a real integer , then k is 
referred to as the order of H (or ord(H) = k mod p) if Hk+1=H (mod p) and there is no 
such . :1  and  mod  mm m k H H p< < =
 
 Gaussian integer Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is defined in the similar way 
the real integer DLP is defined. In the subsequent discussion, to differentiate between 
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these two problems, the Gaussian integer DLP will be denoted with “LOG” and the real 
integer DLP with “log”. 
Definition 1.3.5  Gaussian integer discrete logarithm 
If  G  and H are a Gaussian integers, P is a Gaussian Prime, k is a real integer and 
, or  (MOD )kG H P= LOG  (MOD )G H k P= . 
 
For Blum Gaussian primes DLP is defined as follows: 
Definition 1.3.6  Gaussian integer discrete logarithm (Blum Gaussian primes) 
If  G  and H are a Gaussian integers, p is a Blum Gaussian prime, k is a real integer and 
, then  (mod )kG H p= LOG  (mod )G H k p= . 
 
Note that a different notation for Gaussian DLP modulo Blum Gaussian primes is not 
required because it is differentiated by “MOD” vs. “mod” notation.  
 The notion of a generator for Gaussian integers is defined in the same way as for 
real integers. The formal definition is below: 
Definition 1.3.7  Gaussian integer generator (Blum Gaussian primes) 
A Gaussian integer G is a generator for a Blum Gaussian prime p iff 
. 2ord( ) 1 (mod )G p p= −
 
Note that here a generator for non-Blum Gaussian primes is not defined. The reason for 
this is that such generators are not relevant to the subsequent discussion.  
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 It is worth noting that Gaussian integers form a square lattice ([25]). Moreover, 
Gaussian integers are examples of a more general type of numbers: quadratic integers 
([25]).  It is possible to extend the results presented in this dissertation to quadratic 
integers as described in [25]. Specifically, it is possible to use imaginary quadratic 
integers: 
 
[ ] { : ,  and  QNR}r a b r a b r= + ∈Z Z  (1.21)
 
Such generalization would allow for use of all real primes p (not just Blum 
primes) and still have the large order ( 2 1p − ).  In this dissertation, however, only 
Gaussian integers are considered (i.e., [ 1] { 1 : ,  a b a b− = + − ∈Z Z }). In practice, this is 
not a significant restriction since it is very easy to find primes . : mod 4 3p p =
 
 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation contains five main chapters and conclusion. In this chapter, the notation 
and definitions were introduced along with the introduction and the survey of references. 
Chapter 2 is concerned with the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) with Gaussian 
integers and the exponentiation of Gaussian integers.  The main themes of Chapter 2 are 
the properties of the Gaussian integer exponentiation, comparisons of the Gaussian 
integer DLP to the real integer DLP and computational experiments confirming the 
theoretical findings. It is shown that the cryptosystems based on the Gaussian integer 
DLP have advantages over equivalent in security real integer cryptosystems. Moreover, a 
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novel algorithm for the Gaussian integer exponentiation (Algorithm 2.8.1, Lucas 
sequence Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG)) is introduced and its advantages 
proven theoretically and experimentally.  
 In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, factoring based cryptosystems with Gaussian integers 
are discussed. In Chapter 3, an extension of Rabin cryptosystem into domain of Gaussian 
integers is introduced and discussed. The extension offers an advantage of using less 
reserved bits required for Rabin cryptosystem. In Chapter 4, various extensions or RSA 
into the field of Gaussian integers are analyzed. Some of the extensions are shown to be 
non-viable and for viable extensions it is hard to quantify any benefits over real integer 
RSA.  
 In Chapter 5, a new algorithm, designed to be used with most existing 
watermarking algorithms, is introduced. The new algorithm (Algorithm 5.2.1, Pixel 
rearrangement based on Gaussian integers) is based on the Gaussian integer 
exponentiation. The performance and benefits of this algorithm are discussed and 
compared with the existing algorithms.  
 After each chapter there is a short summary section. The last chapter (Chapter 6) 
is the overall conclusion.  
 
CHAPTER 2 
DISCRETE LOGARITHM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH GAUSSIAN 
INTEGERS 
 
2.1 Gaussian Primes P: |P| is a non-Blum Prime 
Gaussian primes can be divided into two subgroups. One subgroup consists of primes 
P=(p,0) where p is a real prime and p MOD 4=3 or real Blum primes. The second 
subgroup consists of primes P=(a,b) where |P| is a real prime and |P| MOD 4=1. In this 
work, the first subset of Gaussian primes namely Blum primes is considered. In [27], this 
subset was also used to extend ElGamal algorithm.  
There are good reasons for restricting Gaussian domain. Some of the reasons are 
efficiency and simplicity. The question arises: is there anything missed by considering 
only Blum primes? The answer is that nothing is gained by using non-Blum Gaussian 
primes to extend well-known cryptosystems. The reason for this is that, for non-Blum 
Gaussian primes P, there is one to one mapping between Gaussian integers modulo P and 
real integers modulo |P|. This means that it is easy to switch between the two 
representations. Below is a simple algorithm to convert Gaussian integers modulo P to 
real integers modulo p = |P|. 
Algorithm 2.1.1  Convert Gaussian integer to real integer modulo non-Blum Gaussian 
prime 
Given: G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer,  
 P a Gaussian prime such that |P| = p is a real prime and p mod 4 =1 
Find: real integer g 
24 
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Step 1. Compute  
 
1 mods p= −  (2.1)
 
such that  
 MOD s P i=  (2.2)
 
Step 2.  
 
mod g a bs p= +  (2.3)
 
 is the corresponding real number. 
Algorithm 2.1.2  Convert Gaussian integer to real integer modulo non-Blum Gaussian 
prime 
Given: g a real integer, 
p a real prime, p mod 4=1 
P a Gaussian prime such that |P| = p  
Find: Gaussian integer G 
Step 1. Compute G=(g,0) MOD P 
 




Lemma 2.1.1  
If   and  G a bi= + H c di= +  are two Gaussian integers, P is a Gaussian prime, |P|=p is 
a prime such that , mod 4 1p = 1 mods p= − (i.e., MOD s i P= ), ;  ,  
 and k are real integers, then the following facts are true: 
 MOD g a bs p= +
 MOD h c ds p= +
1) 
g MOD P = G and h MOD P = H (2.4) 
2) 
g=h MOD p <=> G=H MOD P (2.5)
3)  
gh MOD P = GH MOD P (2.6)
4)  
g+h MOD P = (G+H) MOD P (2.7)
5)  




g MOD P = (a+bs) MOD P= a+bi MOD P = G MOD P (2.9)
 
h MOD P = (c+ds) MOD P= c+di MOD P = H MOD P (2.10)
 
               




a+bs= c+ds   (MOD p)  (2.11)
 
Appling (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation: 
 
a+bi=c+di  (MOD P)   => G=H (MOD P)  (2.12)
 
To prove the reverse assume that it is given that G=H MOD P. Suppose . modg h p≠
( mod )a bs c ds p+ ≠ +   (2.13)
 
After applying (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation: 
 (MOD )a bi c di P+ ≠ +  => (MOD )G H P≠ ,  (2.14)
 
which is a contradiction because G=H MOD P. Consequently,  
 




 MOD ( )( ) MOD 
( ) MOD 
( ) ( ) MOD  MOD 
gh P a bs c ds P
ac bds s bc ad P
ac bd i bc ad P GH P
= + + =
= + + + =







 MOD ( ) MOD ( ) MOD 
( ) MOD  MOD 
g h P a bs c ds P a c s b d P
a c i b d P G H P
+ = + + + = + + +





   5) Given gk=h mod p, or: 
(a+bs)k = h   (MOD p) (2.18)
 
     Applying (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation: 
 
(a+bs)k  MOD P = h   MOD P (2.19)
 
((a+bs) MOD P)k  MOD P = h   MOD P (2.20)
 
((a+bi) MOD P)k  MOD P = H   MOD P (2.21)
 
Gk=H MOD P  (2.22)
 




( ) modka bs h p+ ≠  (2.23)
 




(  MOD )  MOD  MOD ka bs P P h P+ ≠  (2.24)
 
( )  MOD  MOD ka bi P h P+ ≠  (2.25)
 
MOD kG H P≠ , (2.26)
 
which is a contradiction, thus?  
 




Lemma 2.1.1 implies that DLP problem for Gaussian integers modulo non-Blum 
Gaussian primes can be solved using real integers. An example below illustrates this 
point: 
Example 2.1.1  Reduction of the Gaussian integer DLP modulo non-Blum Gaussian 
prime to the real integer DLP 
Given:  P = 3+2i, |P| = p = |3+2i| = 13. 
G = 1+i, 
G k= 1-i MOD (3+2i) 
Find: Need to find k. 
Solution: 




Table 2.1 below show discrete power Gaussian integer groups MOD P and the 
corresponding real integer group MOD |P|. 
Example 2.1.1 illustrates how DLP problem for Gaussian integers is reduced to 
the real integer DLP problem. This implies that using Gaussian integers modulo non-
Blum Gaussian primes for DLP type cryptosystems does not give any advantages over 
the real integers algorithms. It introduces complexity without any apparent advantages.  
  6k = 9 MOD 13 
However, 8 MOD (3+2i) =-i and 5 MOD (3+2i) =i so set s=5.  
The solution is k = 4. Indeed, (1+i)4 MOD (3+2i) = 1-i.  
For p=13, 1 1 12 mod13p− = − = . There are two square roots of –1 MOD 13: 
5 and 8.  
 
In order to find k, the real integer DLP needs to be solved: 
g = 1+s = 1+5 = 6 (mod 13) 
52 MOD 13=12 and 82mod 13=12 




g (G1) [g1] (G2 ) [g2] (G3 ) [g3] (G4) [g4] (G5 ) [g5] (G6 ) [g6] (G7) [g7] (G8 ) [g8] (G9 ) [g9] (G10) [g10] (G11) [g11] (G12 ) [g12]
1 (1) [1]
2 (2) [2] (-1+i) [4] (-i) [8] (-2i) [3] (1+i) [6] (-1) [12] (-2) [11] (1-i) [9] (i) [5] (2i) [10] (-1-i) [7] (1) [1]
3 (-2i) [3] (1-i) [9] (1) [1]
4 (-1+i) [4] (-2i) [3] (-1) [12] (1-i) [9] (2i) [10] (1) [1]
5 (i) [5] (-1) [12] (-i) [8] (1) [1]
6 (1+i) [6] (2i) [10] (-i) [8] (1-i) [9] (2) [2] (-1) [12] (-1-i) [7] (-2i) [3] (i) [5] (-1+i) [4] (-2) [11] (1) [1]
7 (-1-i) [7] (2i) [10] (i) [5] (1-i) [9] (-2) [11] (-1) [12] (1+i) [6] (-2i) [3] (-i) [8] (-1+i) [4] (2) [2] (1) [1]
8 (-i) [8] (-1) [12] (i) [5] (1) [1]
9 (1-i) [9] (-2i) [3] (1) [1]
10 (2i) [10] (1-i) [9] (-1) [12] (-2i) [3] (-1+i) [4] (1) [1]
11 (-2) [11] (-1+i) [4] (i) [5] (-2i) [3] (-1-i) [7] (-1) [12] (2) [2] (1-i) [9] (-i) [8] (2i) [10] (1+i) [6] (1) [1]
12 (-1) [12] (1) [1]  
Table 2.1 Discrete Power Table MOD P=3+2i, |P|=13, 1mod13 5− = 1
1 Gaussian integers are shown in (). The corresponding real integers are shown in []. 
  
                                                 
 
 Table 2.1 illustrates the one to one correspondence between Gaussian integers 
modulo non-Blum Gaussian primes and real integers. It also illustrates that 
exponentiation operation is also equivalent. 
 As it was shown, the Gaussian integers modulo non-Blum Gaussian primes are 
equivalent to real primes as far as DLP problem is concerned. For this reason such primes 
are excluded from the further DLP analysis which focuses on Blum Gaussian primes. 
 
 
2.2 Common Cryptography Algorithms Based on Discrete Logarithm 
Gaussian integers can replace real integers in cryptosystems that are based on the 
difficulty of computing the Discrete Logarithm. Two most common of these 
cryptosystems are the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol and the ElGamal 
algorithm. 
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman introduced a new key exchange algorithm. This 
algorithm is still widely used.   
Algorithm 2.2.1  The original Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol  
1. Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number p and a generator g. 
2. Alice chooses a secret integer a: 1 < a < p-1, computes  
 
ga mod p (2.28)
 
and sends the result to Bob. 
3. Bob chooses a secret integer b: 1 < b < p-1, computes  
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gb mod p (2.29)
 
and sends the result to Alice. 
4. Alice computes the shared key as follows  
 
k = ( gb mod p)a mod p  (2.30)
 
5. Bob computes the shared key as follows  
 
k = ( ga mod p)b mod p  (2.31)
 
In 1984, Taher ElGamal introduced ElGamal algorithm.  
Algorithm 2.2.2  ElGamal algorithm over the field of real integers  
 
Key generation 
• Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and a generator g. 
• Alice generates a secret integer a: 1 < a < p-1 and computes her private key  
 
ka = ga mod p  (2.32)
 
• Bob generates a secret integer b: 1 < b < p-1 and computes his private key  
 




Encryption (Bob’s actions) 
• Bob selects a random integer 1 < s < p-1. 
• Given message m: 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 Bob computes the ciphertext  
 
( ) modSac m k p=   (2.34)
 
• Bob computes hint  
 
modSh g p=  (2.35)
 
• Bob sends both c and h to Alice 
Decryption (Alice’s actions) 
• Alice computes  
 
modam ch p−=  (2.36)
 
 
Extending the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol is straightforward. The 
extended algorithm is below: 
Algorithm 2.2.3  Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol over the field of Gaussian 
integers 
1. Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number p and a Gaussian integer generator G. 
2. Alice chooses a secret integer a: 1 < a < p2-1, computes  
 




and sends the result to Bob. 
3. Bob chooses a secret integer b: 1 < b < p2-1, computes  
 
Gb mod p (2.38)
 
and sends the result to Alice. 
4. Alice computes the shared key as follows  
 
K=( Gb mod p)a mod p. (2.39)
 
K is a Gaussian integer. 
5. Bob computes the shared key as follows  
 
K=( Ga mod p)b mod p (2.40)
 
It is also quite easy to extend ElGamal algorithm into the field of Gaussian 
integers. Such an extension is described in [27]: 
Algorithm 2.2.4  ElGamal algorithm over the field of Gaussian integers  
Key generation 
• Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and a Gaussian integer generator G. 
• Alice generates a secret integer a: 1 < a < p2-1 and computes her private key  
 
modaaK G p= , (2.41)
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Ka is a Gaussian integer. 
• Bob generates a secret integer b: 1<b<p2-1 and computes his private key  
 
modbbK G p=  (2.42)
 
Kb is a Gaussian integer. 
Encryption (Bob’s actions) 
• Bob selects a random integer 1 < s < p2-1. 
• Given message M , Bob computes the ciphertext  
 
( ) modSaC M K p=  (2.43)
 
M, Ka and C are Gaussian integers. 
• Bob computes hint  
 
modSH G p=  (2.44)
 
H is a Gaussian integer. 
• Bob sends both C and H to Alice 
Decryption (Alice’s actions) 
• Alice computes  
 




2.3 Properties of Gaussian Integer Exponentiation 
For any two complex numbers A and B it is true that |AB|=|A||B|. Gaussian integer is a 
special kind of complex number so it is true for Gaussian integers also. When a Gaussian 
integer C is multiplied by itself modulo p, in turn, the norm of gets multiplied 
by itself also. This means that 
modC p
mod  ( 1, 2,...)iC p i =  will cycle with a period of 
( )ord modC p
2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
 as illustrated in examples below. 
Table 2.2  Repeating Norm Example for Prime p=7  
Power: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16












































































































































Table 2.3  Repeating Norm Examples for Prime p=11 
 
Power: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15



























































































































In addition, Cord(|C|) is a Gaussian integer with norm equal to 1 mod p. In fact, the 
Gaussian integers U: |U| = 1 mod p form a cyclic subgroup with an order (p+1). This 
subgroup will be referred as a Norm 1 subgroup. Moreover, order of any Gaussian integer 
C is a product of ord(|C|) and ord(|U|) where U = Cord(|C|)  mod p. The algorithms for 
finding Gaussian Generators to use for Discrete Logarithm based cryptography are 
derived from this.  The series of theorems below will prove these facts formally. 
Lemma 2.3.1  
If C is a complex number, p is a prime, then  
 
|Cn| = |C|n mod p (2.46)
Proof: 





If C is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime  
1) ord(C) mod p is divisible by ord(|C|) mod p 
2) if Cord(|C|)=U mod p,  then |U|=1 mod p 
3) if U=Cord(|C|) mod p,  then ord(C) mod p is divisible by ord(U) mod p 
Proof: 
1) Suppose ord(C) mod p is not divisible by ord(|C|) mod p. This would mean 
that |Cord(C)| mod p is not equal to 1 but Cord(C)= (1,0). This is a contradiction. 
2) |U| must equal to 1 mod p because |Cn| = |C|n mod p and, in this case, 
. ord(| |)n C=
3) If ord(C) mod p is not divisible by ord(U) then Cord(C) would not equal to (1,0) 




If U is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime and |U| = 1 mod p  
1) the maximum order of U is (p+1) 
2) ord(U) mod p must divide (p+1) 
Proof:  
1) Any Gaussian integer A taken to the power (p+1) mod p is in the form (c,0). 
In this case, Up+1 mod p could be one of either (1,0) or (-1,0) because 
1modU = p . Since p+1 is divisible by 4 for all Blum primes, U(p+1)/4 is a 
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Gaussian integer of Norm 1 and is a root of degree of Up+1. For (-1,0) all roots of 
degree four have a norm equal to –1 mod p. This means that U(p+1) must equal to 
(1,0) mod p. 
2) If p+1 is not divisible by ord(U) then U(p+1) would not equal to (1,0) so p+1 
must be divisible by ord(U). 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.3.4 
If C is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime then 
 
ord(| |)ord( ) ord(| |)ord( ) modCC C C= p , (2.47)
 
Proof: 
 ord(C) must be divisible by ord(|C|) and ord(U) so  
 
ord(C) = nord(|C|)ord(U), (2.48)
 
where n is an integer. In addition,  
 
Cord(|C|)ord(U) = Uord(U) = (1,0). (2.49)
 
Consequently, n must equal to 1. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.3.5  The order of Gaussian integers U’ where |U’| = -1 
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If U is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime and |U’|=-1 mod p  
3) the maximum order of U’ is 2(p+1) 
4) ord(U’) mod p must divide 2(p+1) 
Proof: 
The proof follows directly from Lemma 2.3.3. Note that Gaussian integers U in 
Lemma 2.3.3 are squares of U’ mod p. Therefore, 1) and 2) must be true. 
Q.E.D. 
Corollary 2.3.1 
Let C be a Gaussian integer, p a Blum prime. (p2-1) is divisible by ord(C) mod p. 
Corollary 2.3.2 
 Let G be a Gaussian integer, p a Blum prime.  G is a generator if and only if  
ord(|G|) = p-1 (2.50)
 
and  








Corollary 2.3.1 validates Algorithm 2.10.1. In Algorithm 2.10.1, all the possible powers 
of G mod p that can possibly equal to (1,0) are tested. If G is a generator, only 
equals to (1,0).  




2.4 Discrete Logarithm Complexity for Gaussian Integers 
When using Gaussian integers for Discrete Logarithm based cryptography, an important 
question arises, namely, is it secure? In [38], the Pollard Rho algorithm attack was used 
to asses the security of ElGamal algorithm with Gaussian integers. The results were 
encouraging: it took twice as much time to compute discrete logarithm for Gaussian 
integers. However, these results do not prove that it is secure. In this section, the problem 
of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) for Gaussian integers is analyzed.  
It is clear that DLP for Gaussian integers is at least as hard as DLP for real 
integers, because real integers are a special case of Gaussian integers. Another way of 
stating this is that whenever the DLP for Gaussian integer G modulo p is solved, the real 
integer DLP for the norm of G is also solved. This means that DLP for Gaussian integers 
is at least as hard as DLP for real integers, thus, the Gaussian integer DLP cryptography 
is at least as secure as the analogous real integer DLP cryptography.  
Suppose   
 
modkG p =  (2.53)
 
is given, where G and C are Gaussian integers. k can be represented as  
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k su r= + , (2.54)
 
where u = ord(|G|) mod p, and r = k mod u. If |G| is a real generator, then u equals to p-1. 
In order to find , it is sufficient to find s and r. Since ord(|G|) mod p 
divides p-1 it can be assumed that  
LOG ( ) modG C p
 
1u p= −  (2.55)
 
for any G. 
The problem of finding r is the well known real integer DLP problem:  
 
| |log (| |) modGr C p= , (2.56)
 
Once r is known, s has to be found. Suppose a Gaussian integer D is  
 
1( ) modrD C G p−= , (2.57)
 
and a Gaussian integer U is 
 
ord(| |) modGU G p= , (2.58)
 




LOG ( ) modUs D p=  (2.59)
 
Both U and D belong to the Norm 1 subgroup, because according to Lemma 2.3.2: 
  
|U|  = |D| = 1 mod p.  (2.60)
 
 







Table 2.3, suppose the task is to compute . Here ; (3,4)LOG (9,1) mod11 (3, 4)G = (9,1)C = ; 
; ; 11p = | | mod 3mod11G p = | | mod 5mod11C p = ; ;  1 mod (1,6) mod11G p− =
( )ord mod 5u G p= = . 
First find r:  
 




Now find D and U: 
 
1 3( ) mod (9,1) (1,6) mod11 (5,3) mod11rD C G p−= ⋅ = ⋅ = , (2.62)
 




( ) 2 25,3 5 3 34 1(mod11)D = = + = = , (2.64)
 
and 
( ) 2 25,8 5 8 89 1(mod11)U = = + = = . (2.65)
 
Now find s: 
 
(5,8)LOG ( ) mod LOG (5,3) mod11 2Us D p= = = . (2.66)
 
To find :  (3,4)=LOG (9,1) mod11k
 
2 5 3 13k su r= + = ⋅ + =  (2.67)
 




The problem (2.66) is different from the real integer DLP. The solution to this 
problem is the key to understanding of how much complexity Gaussian integer extension 
adds to DLP. One way to solve it is to use any general DLP algorithm for a cyclic group, 
such as Baby-step giant-step or Pollard’s Rho algorithm. These algorithms work for any 
cyclic group and their running time is O( )N , where N is the order of this cyclic group. 
According to Lemma 2.3.3, the order of Norm 1 subgroup modulo prime p is p+1. Thus, s 
can be computed in O( 1) O( )p p+ =  operations. Consequently, it is possible to 
compute Gaussian integer discrete logarithm with ( )O p , because the running time for 
solving (2.5.4) is O( 1) O( )p p− = . The combined running time for solving the 
Gaussian integer DLP is  
 
O( 1) O( 1) O( )p p p+ + − = . (2.68)
 
In [36] and [38], Pollard’s Rho Algorithm and Baby-step giant-step were used to 
compute DLP for Gaussian integers. Both algorithms have the average running time of 
O( )n  where n is the order of the cyclic group. For Gaussian integers n=p2-1 ([22]). 
Consequently, the expected running time for DLP attack, as described in [36] and [38], is  
 




The complexity of solution of the DLP can be further reduced if the generalized 
BSGS algorithm [64] is applied. The paper demonstrates several enhancements of the 
traditional Shank’s algorithm. 
Currently, the fastest algorithm for real integer Discrete Logarithm runs in sub-
exponential time, which is substantially faster than O( )p .  The apparent question arises: 
is there such an algorithm for the Norm 1 subgroup? The answer to this question is the key 
to understanding of how much complexity Gaussian integer extension adds to DLP.  In the 
next section, this question is addressed.  
 
 
2.5 Reducing Gaussian Integer DLP to Lucas Sequences DLP 
The Gaussian integer exponentiation operation can be represented as a recurrence. This 
representation is useful to derive and prove several formulas. It is useful to illustrate and 
prove properties that are not easily seen with other representations. Let C=(a,b) be a 
Gaussian integer and Ck=(a,b)k=(ak,bk), then 
 
C0 = (1,0) = (a0,b0), (2.70)
 
C1 = (a,b) = (a1,b1), (2.71)
 





The two dimensions of C are the recurrences ai and bi with an interesting property, 
described in the following theorem: 
Theorem 2.5.1  
Gaussian integer Ck mod p can be represented as a recurrence: 
 
( ) 1 2 1, (2 ,2k k k k k k kC a b aa C a ab C b− − −= = − − 2 )− . (2.73)
 
where a0=1, a1=a,  b0=0, b1=b.  
Proof: The theorem can be easily proved using the mathematical induction. The 
induction base: 
 
( ) ( )2 2 2 1 0 1, 2 2 , 2C a b ab aa C a ab C b= − = − − 0  (2.74)
 
is a true identity, since a0 = 1, a1 = a, b0 = 0, b1 = b.  
Assume that for r ≤ k, the recurrence is true. The following needs to be proved:  
 









( ) 2 2,k kk kC a b C C−= = =  (2.77)
 
( 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,k k k ka a b b a b b a− − − −= − + )  (2.78)
 
2 2 2 2k k ka a a b b− −= − =  (2.79)
 
2
2 2(2 ) 2k ka a C b ab− −= − − =  (2.80)
 
2
2 22 2k k ka a b ab C a− − −= − − 2 = . (2.81)
 
( )2 2 2 12 2k k k k ka aa b b C a aa C a− − − −= − − = − 2−  (2.82)
 
( )22 2 2 2 2 22 2k k k k kb a b b a a ab b a C− − − −= + = + − =  (2.83)
 
2
2 2 22 2k k ka ab b a b C− − −= + − = . (2.84)
 






 Using this theorem it is possible to show how to reduce the Gaussian integer DLP 
to the Lucas sequences DLP. The theorem below describes this relationship. 
Theorem 2.5.2  
If C=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer, Ck=(ak,bk), then the sequence a0,a1,…,ak can be 
represented as a standard Lucas sequence ( )2 ,V a C as follows: 
( )2 , 2 ,     0,1,....i iV a C a i= =  (2.86)
 
and the sequence b0,b1,…,bk  relates to the Lucas sequence ( )2 ,U a C as follows: 
 
( ) 12 , ,     0,1,....i iU a C b b i−= = . (2.87)
 
 
Proof: Using mathematical induction: 
1) The theorem is correct for k=0 and k=1: 
 
0






1 1 2 2a a a V a a= = ⇒ = = . (2.89)
 
1
0 00 0 0b U





1 1 1b b b V b b1
−= = ⇒ = = . (2.91)
 
2) Assume  and (2 ,| |) 2i iV a C a=
1(2 , )k kU a C b b
−= for i k< . 
3) Prove ( )2 , 2k kV a C a=  and ( ) 12 ,kU a C b bk −= . According to Theorem 2.5.2: 
1 22k k ka a C a− −= − . (2.92)
1 22k k kb b C b− −= − . (2.93)
 
Using the assumption of step 2) of the induction: 
 
( ) ( )11 2 1 22 2 , 2k k k k ka aa C a aV a C C V a C−− − − −= − = − 2 ,  (2.94)
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 22 2 2 , 2 , 2 ,k k k ka aV a C C V a C V a C− −= − =  (2.95)
 
( ) ( )1 2 1 22 2 2 , 2 ,k k k k kb ab C b abU a C b C U a C− − − −= − = −  (2.96)
 







In other words, whenever the Gaussian integer C=(a,b) is raised to some power, 
the first dimension contains the Lucas sequence Vk  and the second dimension contains 
the Lucas sequence Uk . The table below illustrates this. 
 
Table 2.4   Gaussian Integer Exponentiation and Lucas Sequences Side-by-side 
Power k: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
(3,7)k 
mod 19 
(1,0) (3,7) (17,4) (4,17) (7,3) (0,1) (12,3) (15,17) (2,4) (16,7) (18,0) (16,12) (2,15)
2ak mod 
19
2 6 15 8 14 0 5 11 4 13 17 13 4
Vk(6,1) 
mod 19 2 6 15 8 14 0 5 11 4 13 17 13 4
bkb-1  
mod 19
0 1 6 16 14 11 14 16 6 1 0 18 13
Uk(6,1) 
mod 19
0 1 6 16 14 11 14 16 6 1 0 18 13
 
 
The relationship described by Theorem 2.5.2 allows to reduce the Gaussian 
integer DLP to a better-known problem of the Lucas sequences DLP. Two cryptosystems 
based on  DLP for Lucas sequences LUCDIF and LUCELG were introduced in [63].  
These are Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal algorithms formulated with Lucas sequences 
where . The main selling point of “LUC” algorithms was a notion 
that they are not based on exponentiation; therefore, presumably, they are not vulnerable 
to sub-exponential time attacks. However, these assumptions were proven to be wrong. 
Papers [52] and [51] show that sub-exponential time algorithms can be applied to Lucas 
sequences.  
( , )kV P Q 1modQ ≡ p
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On the other hand, Lucas sequences still offer a significant security advantage 
over real integers. The sub-exponential algorithm for Lucas sequences would have to run 
in a group of order p2-1, as opposed the group of order of order p-1 with real integers.  
Another important point to note is that Norm 1 subgroup described in previous 
section contains Lucas sequences  and  with  (according 
to Theorem 2.5.2). Consequently, even though the order of Norm 1 subgroup is p+1, the 
sub-exponential DLP algorithm would have to be applied in a group of order p
( , )kV P Q ( , )kU P Q 1modQ ≡ p
p
2-1. This 
means that the Gaussian integer DLP is substantially harder then the real integer DLP 
(with algorithms currently known). Moreover, when solving the Gaussian integer DLP 
one would have to solve two problems: 
1. The Lucas sequences DLP with 1modQ ≡ (or equivalently the Gaussian integer 
DLP in the Norm 1 subgroup). 
2. The real integer DLP. 
The fact that these two problems seem to be very different, bodes well for 
cryptography algorithms based on the Gaussian integer DLP. A solution of one problem 
may not lead to a solution of the other, thus the Gaussian integers offer additional 
protection.  
When comparing the speed of the algorithms that utilize the DLP over Lucas 
sequences with the corresponding algorithms that utilize Gaussian integers, a strong case 
could be made for Gaussian integers even though this topic is not in scope of this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, the indications are that the Gaussian integer exponentiation is 
not slower than Lucas sequence computation under LUC cryptographic algorithms, but is 
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most likely faster. The actual speed varies greatly with implementation details and the 
choice of exponentiation algorithms.  
The Gaussian integer DLP is a combination of two problems: the well known real 
integer DLP and the DLP over an interesting subgroup of Gaussian integer group: Norm 1 
subgroup. The complexity of Norm 1 subgroup DLP holds the key to the understanding of 
the complexity of the Gaussian integer DLP. The reduction of the Gaussian integer DLP 
to the Lucas sequences DLP allows to assess the security of the Gaussian integer DLP. 
The Norm 1 DLP turned out to be equivalent in security to the Lucas sequences DLP used 
in well-known cryptosystems LUCDIF and LUCELG. LUCDIF and LUCELG are 
thought to be more secure than the corresponding algorithms with real integers. Therefore, 
the algorithms based on the Gaussian integer DLP (such as the one in [27]) are more 
secure. Furthermore, the Gaussian integer DLP contains the real integer DLP, providing 
additional security through diversification. Luckily, algorithms with Gaussian integers are 
efficient and easy to implement. Moreover, they are potentially more efficient than the 
corresponding “LUC” algorithms. Thus, the algorithms based on the Gaussian integer 
DLP offer a great alternative to the real integer DLP or “LUC” algorithms.   
 
 
2.6 Multiplication of Gaussian Integers vs. Real Integer Multiplication 
Since the size of the group of the exponentiation cyclic group of Gaussian integers is 
, it is appropriate to compare the Gaussian integer multiplication modulo p to real 
integer multiplication modulo q, where q is double the size of p. Suppose 
2 1p −
2logn p= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  
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(or in other words n is the number of binary bits of p). Let  q be the closest prime to p2. In 
that case, the size of q in bits would be approximately 2n or    
 
2log 2q n≈⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ . (2.98)
  
  For small n, the naïve multiplication method [44] with complexity of  is 
most efficient. For larger n, the Karatsuba-Ofman [43] multiplication algorithm is 
appropriate with the running time of . For even larger n, the Toom-Cook 3-way 
(or Toom-3) [44] multiplication with the running time  is appropriate. As n 





( )log(2 1)/logk kn −Ο can be applied ([44]). For extremely large n, the algorithms 
based on the Fast Fourier transforms (FFT) are more efficient.  The Schönhage–Strassen 
algorithm [60] is based on the FFT and runs in ( log log log )n n nΟ . The Fürer's algorithm 
published in [31] is also based on the FFT and offer an even better running time, that is 
. The FFT algorithms have a lot of overhead, and, consequently are used 
for very large n, far larger then the numbers used for public key cryptography. Therefore, 
the FFT algorithms will not be considered in the subsequent discussion. 
log*( log 2 )nn nΟ
 In order to do a theoretical comparison of the Gaussian integer multiplication to 
the real integer multiplication, three cases need to be considered: 
1) The numbers are small enough to warrant the naïve multiplication method. Under this 
assumption, it is clear that the Gaussian integer multiplication time grows slower than 
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the real integer multiplication time. Assuming  is the time it takes to multiply two 
real integers of size n modulo p: 
( )t n
 
3 ( )G Gt t n c n dG= + + . (2.99)
 
where  is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p, 
is the overhead ( integer additions modulo p), and  is a constant overhead term. 
Gt
Gc Gd
On the other hand: 
(2 ) 4 ( )r rt t n t n c n d= = + + r , (2.100)
 
where  is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of the size 2n modulo q, 
and
rt
rc  rd are the overhead terms associated with the naïve algorithm. Here  is 
smaller then , while and terms are negligible
rc










This constitutes a maximum of 25% theoretical improvement. Note that the 
assumption that n  is incorrect because, under most implementations, at some 
threshold, the naïve method would be replaced by a more efficient algorithm. There is 
more overhead associated with the Gaussian integer multiplication, therefore, for a 





2)  The numbers are sufficiently large to warrant the Karatsuba multiplication, but not 
large enough to warrant the Toom-3 multiplication. In this case,  would be 
represented by the same formula as in 1). Assuming  is the time it takes to 




3 ( )G Gt t n c n dG= + + . (2.102)
 
where  is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p, cGt 1 
is the overhead ( integer additions modulo p). 
On the other hand, using the recursive step: 
 




where  is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q, is the 
overhead associated with the Karatsuba algorithm (it is the time related to the number 
of additions). Here is about twice the size of , while and terms are 
negligible
rt rc
rc Gc Gd rd
.
Since is about twice as large as , it is safe to conclude that, under the Karatsuba 
multiplication, and 
rc Gc




= .  There is more overhead associated with the 
Gaussian integer multiplication, therefore, for small n,  will be lower than . rt Gt
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3) The numbers are sufficiently large to warrant the Toom-3 multiplication. Under this 
assumption, the real integer multiplication time grows slower than the Gaussian 
integer multiplication. Assuming  is the time it takes to multiply two real integers 
of size n modulo p: 
( )t n
 
3 ( )G Gt t n c n dG= + + . (2.104)
 
where  is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p, 
is the overhead ( integer additions modulo p), and  is a constant overhead term. 
Gt
Gc Gd
On the other hand: 
 
(2 ) 2.76 ( )r rt t n t n c n d= = + + r . (2.105)
 
where  is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q,  and rt rc








≈ ≈ . (2.106)
 
This means that the Gaussian integer multiplication is about 9% slower under this 
setting. Note that the assumption that  is incorrect because, under most 
implementations, at some threshold, the Toom-3 method would be replaced by more 
efficient algorithm. There is more overhead associated with the Gaussian integer 





 The same arguments apply to squares, even though the squaring is generally faster 
than the multiplication. In theory, the squaring is up to twice as fast as multiplication, 
because the multiplication can be done using two squares: 
 
2 2( ) ( )
4
a b a bab + − −= . (2.107)
 
 In practice, however, the square is much slower then half of a multiplication. The 
GMP manual [34] states that a square is around 1.5 times faster than a multiplication, if 
the library settings are optimized. Incidentally, the Gaussian integer squaring is also 1.5 
times faster relatively to the Gaussian integer multiplication on all platforms (refer to 
Algorithm 1.3.1 and Algorithm 1.3.2).  Therefore, the relationship between the speed of 
































































Figure 2.1  The ratio of the running time of multiplication of two numbers of the equal 
size vs. the running time of square of a number of the same size. The graph represents a 
typical performance of GMP 5.0.1 library on various platforms. 
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 It is possible that the threshold cutoff size would lie between n and 2n (for 
example the real integer multiplication will be done with the Toom-3 algorithm, but the 
Gaussian integer multiplication will be done under the Karatsuba or the naïve algorithm). 
In this case, the exact thresholds would have to be known in order to compare the two 
multiplications (or squares) correctly. Unfortunately, the exact thresholds at which the 
one multiplication algorithm is more efficient then the other are heavily dependant on the 
architecture and the implementation. The bit count of thresholds varies widely among 
various architectures and implementations.  
 Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the threshold values for different squaring 
algorithms used by GMP 5.0.1.  The values are compiled during the installation of the 
library. The purpose of this figure is to give a sense for the threshold values. The figures 
show the following: 
1) the thresholds for squares tend to be higher than for multiplications  


































Figure 2.2 The distribution of optimal multiplication thresholds among various platforms 


































Figure 2.3 The distribution of optimal square thresholds among different platforms and 
counts for GMP 5.0.1. 
  
Suppose  is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo 
p and  is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q. Suppose 
that both multiplications are performed with the same multiplication algorithm that has 








 (i.e., 2α =  for naïve, 1.585α =  for Karatsuba and 1.465α =  for Toom-3 
multiplication). As mentioned before, the FFT multiplication algorithms are not 
considered, so the formula (2.108) is sufficient to describe all applicable multiplication 
algorithms for the analysis.  For simplicity, an assumption can be made that both 
multiplications are performed using the same algorithm, even though, in reality, it is 
possible that the threshold cutoff size would lie between n and 2n (for example the real 
integer multiplication will be done with the Toom-3 algorithm, but the Gaussian integer 
multiplication will be done with the Karatsuba or naïve algorithm). In this case, the exact 
thresholds have to be known to compare the multiplications (or squares) correctly. As 
mentioned above, the exact thresholds at which the one multiplication algorithm is more 
efficient then the other are heavily dependant on the architecture and the implementation. 
Moreover, this assumption would make the real integer exponentiation look slightly 
faster. Therefore, this assumption could be allowed without compromising the proof that 
the Gaussian integer exponentiation is faster. The overhead (lower order operations like 











= = . (2.109)
 

















where  is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p and  
is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q. 
Gs rs
From (2.109) it is clear that Gt tr<  under the naïve multiplication algorithm, 
 under the Karatsuba multiplication and  under the Toom-3 multiplication. 
As stated before, the cutoff thresholds vary widely it would be an impossible task to 
analyze all the possible combinations of platforms and bit counts. It is obvious with some 
combinations of platforms and bit counts real integer multiplication will be faster, and, 
with many, the Gaussian integer multiplication will be faster.  
Gt t≈ r rGt t>
Fortunately, even though it is hard to answer definitively which multiplication is 
faster, it is possible to say that the Gaussian integer multiplication modulo p is faster. The 
differences between two multiplications are insignificant compared with the advantages 
of the “mod” operation for Gaussian integers. Therefore, the Gaussian integer 
exponentiation turns out to be faster. 
The modulo division operation is much slower than the multiplication. For small 
to moderate integer sizes, the divide-and-conquer division algorithm ([16]) is commonly 
used. The speed of this division algorithm depends on the multiplication algorithm used. 
If ( ) cM n Dn= is the multiplication time and  is the division time of an integer of 




1( ) ( ) ( log )
2 1c
T n M n n n−< +Ο−
. (2.111)
 
This translates to  
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2( ) ( log )T n n n n< +Ο  (2.112)
 
for the naïve multiplication, 
 
1.585( ) 2 ( log )T n n n n< +Ο  (2.113)
 
for the Karatsuba multiplication (which agrees with [15]), and to 
 
1.465( ) 2.63 ( log )T n n n n< +Ο  (2.114)
 
for the Toom-3 multiplication. ([16],[40],[34]). In practice, the speed of the division is 
about two to four times slower than the speed of the multiplication for moderately large 








































































Figure 2.4  Running time of mod operation versus multiplication using GMP 5.0.1 
library on AMD Opteron Model 2218 @2.6 GHz Dual core, 8GB of RAM, RHEL Linux 





































































Figure 2.5 Running time of mod operation divided by the running time of multiplication 
using GMP 5.0.1 library on AMD Opteron Model 2218 @2.6 GHz Dual core, 8GB of 
RAM, RHEL Linux 4.2 kernel 2.6.9 (64 bit). 
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 In exponentiation algorithms, the costly mod operation is replaced with the 
Montgomery reduction or REDC() operation ([55]), which is more efficient. It is possible 
to implement Montgomery reduction with the Gaussian integer exponentiation also. In 
fact, the Gaussian integer exponentiation still retains its speed advantages with 
Montgomery reduction used in place of mod. The REDC() operation speed varies 
depending on a platform and an implementation from about 1.2 multiplications to two 
multiplications ([14]). With GMP 5.0.1, the average is about 1.5 multiplications.  
 Whether the modulo division or the Montgomery REDC() function is used, the 
speed of the reduction at each multiplication or square step can be expressed as 
 
( ) ( )rR n t nβ= , (2.115)
 
where ( )R n  is the division time of an integer of size 2n by an integer (prime in this case) 
of size n, is the multiplication time of two real integers of size n, and ( )rt n :1 4β β< < is 
some constant. 
 Suppose is the time required for a multiplication with a reduction for Gaussian 




3 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 2lim
(2 ) (2 ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 (1 )
G r r r
n
r r r r
T t n R n t n t n












2 ( ) 2 ( ) 6 ( ) 6 ( ) 6(1 )lim 2 2 2 ( ) 3*2 ( ) 2 (2 3 )(2 ) (2 )
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S t n R n t n t n










where  is the time required for a multiplication with a reduction for Gaussian integers 




Table 2.5  Summarized Estimates of the Multiplication Running Time Ratio Based on 










β=1 0.63 0.83 0.91 0.94 
β=1.2 0.61 0.82 0.89 0.93 
β=1.4 0.60 0.81 0.88 0.91 
β=1.5 0.60 0.80 0.87 0.91 
β=1.7 0.59 0.79 0.86 0.90 
β=2 0.58 0.78 0.85 0.88 
β=2.2 0.58 0.77 0.84 0.87 
β=2.5 0.57 0.76 0.83 0.86 
β=3 0.56 0.75 0.82 0.85 


















β=1 0.60 0.80 0.87 0.91 
β=1.2 0.59 0.79 0.85 0.89 
β=1.4 0.58 0.77 0.84 0.88 
β=1.5 0.58 0.77 0.84 0.87 
β=1.7 0.57 0.76 0.83 0.86 
β=2 0.56 0.75 0.82 0.85 
β=2.2 0.56 0.74 0.81 0.84 
β=2.5 0.55 0.74 0.80 0.84 
β=3 0.55 0.73 0.79 0.82 
β=4 0.54 0.71 0.78 0.81 
 
As Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show, the Gaussian integer exponentiation is faster on 
all platforms because the underlying multiplication and square operations (combined with 
Montgomery or modulo reductions) are faster for Gaussian integers. The exact speedup 
would depend on a platform, integer sizes, and the exponentiation algorithm logic (i.e., 
number of multiplications and squares). Realistically, for the integer sizes used for Public 
Key cryptography (1000-4000 bits) the expected speedup is around 20% with Gaussian 
integers. The rational for this is that the estimated speedup ratios for multiplications and 
squares for Montgomery reduction with 1.5β =  and the Karatsuba multiplication are 
0.80 and 0.77, so, regardless of the ratio of multiplications/squares in a particular 




2.7 Computation of Lucas Sequences 
Theorem 2.5.1 and Theorem 2.5.2 show the relationship between Gaussian integers and 
Lucas sequences. According to these theorems, it is possible to use one to compute the 
other. In this section, an existing algorithm for computing Lucas sequences is reviewed 
and an improvement is introduced. In [74], the efficient algorithm was published to 
compute Vn for Q=1. Below, this algorithm is extended to compute both Un and Vn by 














Algorithm 2.7.1 Computation of Lucas Sequences with Q = 1 











= ∑ 2logn k= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥   
(P, Q = 1) – Lucas sequence parameters 
Outputs: (Vk, Uk)  
1. Vl := 2; Vh := P;  
2. for j=n-1 downto 0 
3.    if (k[j] = 1) 
4.          Vl := Vh * Vl – P; 
5.       Vh := Vh * Vh – 2; 
6.       else 
7.    Vh := Vh * Vl – P; 
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8.       Vl := Vl * Vl – 2; 
9.    endif 
10. endfor 
11. Uk := (2*Vh-P*Vl)/(P*P-4*Q); 
12. return (Vl,Uk) 
 
Note that the number of multiplications in Algorithm 2.8.1 is 22 log k + c⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ , where c is a 
small constant. Additionally, the algorithm can be used to compute Un and Vn  modulo 
prime p. 
 The algorithm to compute both Un and Vn  for any P and Q was published in [42] . 
Such an algorithm could be useful for various purposes. As an example, the authors 
suggest using it to compute the order of an elliptic curve. It is useful for cryptosystems 
based on exponentiation of Gaussian integers as will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
The improvement to the algorithm published in [42]  was published in [47]: 
Algorithm 2.7.2  Computation of Lucas Sequences for any P and Q 











= ∑ 2logn k= ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥   
(P, Q) – Lucas sequence parameters 
Outputs: (Vk, Uk)  
1. Vl := 2; Vh := P;  
2. Ql :=1; Qh := 1; 
3. for j=n-1 downto 0 
4. Ql := Ql * Qh; 
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5. if (k[j] = 1) 
6. Qh := Ql * Q; 
7. Vl := Vh * Vl – P * Ql; 
8. Vh := Vh * Vh – 2 * Qh; 
9. else 
10. Qh := Ql; 
11. Vh := Vh * Vl – P * Ql; 
12. Vl := Vl * Vl – 2 * Qh; 
13. endif 
14. endfor 
15. Uk := (2*Vh-P*Vl)/(P*P-4*Q); 
16. return (Vl,Uk) 
 
Note that Algorithm 2.7.2 for Q = 1 or Q = -1 still has same running time as 
Algorithm 2.7.1. The number of multiplications in Algorithm 2.7.2 is 22 log k c+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ , 
where c is a small constant.  
 
 
2.8 Exponentiation of Gaussian Integers 
As shown in the previous sections, the Gaussian integer exponentiation is faster then the 
real integer exponentiation when real integers are replaced with the Gaussian integers. 
However, an even faster exponentiation algorithm for Gaussian integers can be devised. 
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It is based on the relationship between Gaussian integers and Lucas sequences described 
in [50].  
 
Algorithm 2.8.1  Lucas sequence Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG) 
Inputs:  Gaussian integer ( , )a b
 p – prime such that mod 4 3p =  
 n - exponent 
Output: Gaussian integer ( , ) ( , ) modnx y a b= p  
1. 
1




= p  
2.  1( , ) ( , ) modc d r a b p−=
3.  mod( 1) modn ph r p−=
4.  mod(2( 1))m n p= +
5. if ( )  2 ( , ) (mod )r a b p==
6.                 Compute Lucas sequences ( 2 , 1)mV P c Q= =  and   ( 2 , 1)mU P c Q= =
7. else 
8.                 Compute Lucas sequences   ( 2 , 1)mV P c Q= = −  and   ( 2 , 1)mU P c Q= = −
9. endif       
10. 1 mod
2m
px hV p+=  
11.  modmy hU c p=
12. return (x,y) 
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 Given a Gaussian integer ( , , prime )a b : mod 4 3p p =  and , 
suppose the aim is compute .  First step is to compute  
2: 0 1n n p< < −
( , ) modna b p
 
1




= p . (2.119)
 
r would be the square root of | (  if a square root exists. If | (  is QNR (i.e., the 
square root does not exist) modulo p, then 
, ) |a b , ) |a b
( , ) modr a b= − p . Next step is to compute  
 
1( , ) ( , ) modc d r a b p−= . (2.120)
 
It is important to note that ( , ) mod 1 or -1c d p = , because: 
 
2 2 2 2
2( , ) (mod )
a b a bc d p
r r r
+⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. (2.121)
 
2r is either ( , ) moda b p− or ( , ) moda b p depending on whether | (  is QNR or not. 
 was factored into a product of a real integer r and Gaussian integer , and 
, ) |a b
( , )a b ( , )c d
( , ) mod 1 or -1c d p = : 
 




To compute the following values have to be computed:  ( , ) modna b p
 
mod( 1) modn pr p−  (2.123)
 
and                 
 
( , ) modnc d p . (2.124)
            
 To compute (2.123) it is possible to use any available real integer exponentiation 
modulo prime algorithm (the order of real integer modulo p is 1p − , so n can be reduced 
modulo ). In order to compute (2.124), the relationship between Gaussian integers 
and Lucas sequences described in algorithm in [50] could be used. To compute (2.124), it 
is enough to compute 
1p −
( )( )2 , ,mV c c d , ( )( )2 , ,mU c c d   and  








where  (the order of Lucas sequences with  is  (Lemma 
2.3.3) and with  is 2(
mod(2( 1))m n p= + 1Q = 1p +
1Q = − 1)p +  (Lemma 2.3.5)). and could be efficiently 
computed using any published algorithm to compute Lucas sequences, such as [74] or 
[68]. The algorithms published in [74] and [68] would only compute 
mV mU
( )2 ,1mV c , however, 
they can be easily enhanced to compute ( )2 , 1mV c − , ( )2 , 1mU c −  or ( )2 ,1mU c . Finally 
few more multiplications are needed to get the final answer: 
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( , ) ( , ) (mod )n n na b r c n p= . (2.126)
 
Example 2.8.1  Gaussian integer exponentiation with LSEG Algorithm 
Inputs:  Gaussian integer ( , ) (2,5)a b =
 p = 23 – prime  
 n = 423 – exponent 
Output: Gaussian integer ( , ) ( , ) modnx y a b= p  
1. ( )
23 11
2 2 644: ( , ) mod 2 5 mod 23 6 mod 23 12
p
r a b p
++




2.  1 1( , ) : ( , ) mod 12 (2,5) mod 23 2(2,5) mod 23 (4,10)c d r a b p− −= = = =
3.  mod( 1) 423mod 22 5: mod 12 mod 23 12 mod 23 18n ph r p−= = =
4.  : mod(2( 1)) 423mod 48 39m n p= + =
5. ( )2 ( , ) (mod )r a b p== is true: 212 mod 23 6==  , therefore: 
6.                 Compute 39( 2 , 1) (8,1) 18(mod 23)mV P c Q V= = = =   
7.                 Compute 39( 2 , 1) (8,1) 6(mod 23mU P c Q U )= = = =  
8.  1 mod 18*18*12 mod 23 1
2m
px hV p+= = =
=
 
9.  mod 18*6*10 mod 23 22my hU c p= =
10. return (x,y) = (1,22) 
The speed advantage of Algorithm 2.8.1 is due to the fact that it does less work. 
Note that the most expensive operations in this algorithm are two real integer 
exponentiations (lines 1 and 3) and one Lucas sequences computation (line 6 or line 8).  
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The speed advantage of Algorithm 2.8.1 would vary depending on the exponentiation 
algorithm used and there are too many variations to consider. To illustrate the speed 
advantage of Algorithm 2.8.1, it can be compared to the sliding window Montgomery 
Gaussian integer exponentiation algorithm, same as the one implemented by GMP ([34] 
section 16.4.2, [54] algorithm 14.85). The exponentiation algorithm modulo prime 
implemented by GMP is a highly efficient implementation and is widely used for 
cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, the sliding window exponentiation algorithm holds 
advantage over many other exponentiation algorithms for average case and random 
exponent ([45], [33]) and, therefore, it is used by GMP library for modular 
exponentiation.  
The sliding window Montgomery reduction exponentiation algorithm for 
Gaussian integers is denoted as SWG (Sliding Window Gaussian). It is the same 
algorithm as the one implemented by GMP, but with real integers replaced with Gaussian 
integers modulo prime : mod 4 3p p = . The prime p is n bits long. Suppose the window 
size is w and the exponent is 2: 0 1e e p< < − . Suppose also that e is such that the number 
of multiplications is 2n
w
 (the best case for sliding window algorithm). This assumption is 
reasonable because mostly random looking exponents are used for cryptographic 
applications. In case this assumption is not true, the SWG algorithm would be even 
slower compared to Algorithm 2.8.1. Suppose is the running time of one 
multiplication of two integers of n bits long and  is the running time of SWG 
algorithm (ignoring lower order operations like additions). For each Gaussian integer 






operations REDC() have to be performed. For each Gaussian integer square two real 
integer multiplications  and two Montgomery reduction operations REDC() have to 
be performed. Each REDC() operation has a cost of 
( )rt n
( )rt nβ . The precomputation required 
for the sliding window algorithm could be ignored, it is larger for SWG algorithm, but 
becomes less significant as n grows. Thus: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
22 2 2 3 2
3 22 2 2
SWG r r r r
r






= + + +





For Algorithm 2.8.1 the same sliding window exponentiation with Montgomery reduction 
for real integer exponentiation can be used.  Two real integer exponentiations with 
exponents less than half the size of e in bits have to be done. To compute Lucas 
sequences, the algorithm [74] could be used. The size of the exponent for this algorithm 
is approximately one half of the size of e (i.e., n, not 2n) and for each bit one 
multiplication, one square and two REDC() operations are required. It can be assumed 
that the square takes 2
3
 of the time of multiplication. Suppose  is the running time 
of Algorithm 2.8.1, ignoring lower order operations, like additions. As with SWG, 
precomputation required for sliding window algorithm could be ignored, noting that it is 





( )22 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3
12 ( ) 1.5 2
LSEG r r r r
r r r r
r
nT n t n t n t n t n
w






⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ + + + =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠





Thus the improvement based on various window sizes and values ofβ  could be 
estimated. 
Table 2.7  Ratio for Various /LSEG SWGT T β  and Window Sizes 
 w=1 w=2 w=3 w=4 w=5 w=6 w=7 w=8
β=1 0.61 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81
β=1.2 0.62 0.70 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.82
β=1.4 0.63 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.83
β=1.5 0.64 0.72 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84
β=1.7 0.64 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84
β=2 0.65 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85
β=2.2 0.66 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86
β=2.5 0.67 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87
β=3 0.68 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88
β=4 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89
 
As illustrated by Table 2.7, Algorithm 2.8.1 offers an improvement approximately 18% 
over SWG for the window size relevant to real world cryptography applications (1000-
4000 bits and window size 7). This translates to about 35% theoretic improvement over 
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SWR, but in practice it would be much higher because of low overhead associated with 
Algorithm 2.8.1. Moreover, the real time could be significantly improved if (2.123) and 
(2.124) are computed in parallel.  
 It is easy to estimate the real running time improvement ratio of Algorithm 2.8.1 
(LSEG) implemented with threads that compute (2.123) and (2.124) in parallel. Such 
algorithm shell be denoted as LSEG*. It is easy to see that the computation of (2.123) will 
be faster than the computation of (2.124) (real integer exponentiation is faster than Lucas 
sequence computation for the same prime). Therefore, the running time of LSEG* as 
follows can be estimated as follows: 
 
( )*
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3
12 ( ) 1.16666 1.5
2
LSEG r r r r
r r r r
r
nT n t n t n t n t n
w






⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ + + + =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠









Table 2.8  Ratio for Various * /LSEG SWGT T β  and Window Sizes 
 w=1 w=2 w=3 w=4 w=5 w=6 w=7 w=8
β=1 0.41 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.60
β=1.2 0.41 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61
β=1.4 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62
β=1.5 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62
β=1.7 0.43 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63
β=2 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.63
β=2.2 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
β=2.5 0.44 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
β=3 0.45 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65
β=4 0.46 0.54 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66
 
As Table 2.8 shows, the multithreaded version of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG*) offers an 
improvement approximately 39% over SWG for the window size relevant to real world 
cryptography applications (1000-4000 bits and window size 7). This translates to about 
52% theoretic improvement over SWR, but in practice it would be much somewhat lower 
because of the overhead associated with multithreaded programming. Nevertheless, it is a 
great improvement ratio considering this algorithm does not require any special hardware 
or software and can be easily implemented.  
 Most contemporary platforms have multiple processors and/or multiple cores. On 
such platforms the parallel implementation of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG*) is more 
advantageous because with a relatively small added cost associated with multithreading, a 
significant improvement in real running time was achieved. The overhead varies widely 
among platforms and implementations but it tends to be relatively small compared to an 
added benefit in real running time.  
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2.9 Experimental Results 
For the experiments the latest release of GMP library 5.0.1 was used. On each platform, 
the library was installed and the optimization step performed. The language used was C 
compiled it with gcc compiler. The version of gcc did vary across the platforms, 
however, it is not important for this study, because only relative running times on the 
same platform compiled with the same optimization level were of interest. The sliding 
window exponentiation with the Montgomery reduction algorithm for Gaussian integers 
with the optimal sliding window size (SWG) was implemented. The optimal sliding 
window size was calculated for every exponent.   
For real integer exponentiation, mpz_powm function was used that came with 
GMP library. It was implemented using the Sliding Window exponentiation algorithm 
(algorithm 14.85 in [54]) using Montgomery reduction (section 16.4.2 in [34]). This 
algorithm for real integers shall be labeled as SWR (Sliding Window Real). The SWG 
was implemented as efficiently as possible; however, it still has more overhead than 
GMP’s “mpz_powm” function. Some of this overhead is due to the fact that Gaussian 
integer multiplications and squares require extra additions, which was ignored in the 
estimates. Some of this overhead is due to the fact that GMP implementations tend to be 
very efficient because they use low level platform specific techniques to minimize the 
overhead and speedup the calculations. Nevertheless, this implementation of SWG 
overtook SWR for bit sizes above 1000 on all platforms and showed the predicted in 
previous section 20% speed advantage.  
Two versions of Algorithm 2.8.1 were implemented. Both versions used 
“mpz_powm” function for real integer exponentiation and the algorithm published in [74] 
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for Lucas sequences computations. The first version (LSEG) executed the steps of 
Algorithm 2.8.1 sequentially. For small bit sizes (500-2500 bits) it performed better than 
predicted, relative to the implementation of SWG. This is due to the fact that it has much 
less overhead than SWG, and the estimates in Table 2.5 are biased towards SWG (make 
SWG look faster). For really high bit sizes (>4000) the experimental results confirm the 
estimates in Table 2.5 (show 15% speedup), but for the bit sizes that are practical for 
cryptography the results show improvement of 40-20%, which is much better than 
predicted 18%.  
The second version of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG*) was implemented using threads 
to process real integer exponentiation and Lucas sequences computation in parallel. As 
Figure 2.6 demonstrates, the CPU time needed for LSEG* is slightly higher than the CPU 
time needed for LSEG. However, the difference is very small. It is due to the overhead 
associated with threads. On the other hand, the reduction in real time is very significant 
as Figure 2.10 demonstrates. The achieved improvements are in line with the estimates in 
Table 2.8. Similar results were achieved on all platforms. 
 The experiments were performed for bit sizes varying from 100 to 11500 bits. For 
each bit size, a random prime : mod 4 3p p =  of bit size n and prime q of bit size from 
2n-1 to 2n were generated. The CPU performance varied widely among the platforms, so 
the number of trials N was calibrated for each platform, so one could differentiate 
between the performance of the algorithm for lower bit sizes and it would finish in a 
reasonable amount of time for high bit sizes. For each bit size the following numbers 
were randomly generated: 
1) N Gaussian integers ( , ) : 0 , 1a b a b p< < −  
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2) N exponents  2: 0 1e e p< < −
3) N real integers    : 0 1c c q< < −
For each of the N Gaussian integers (  were computed using SWG, LSEG and 
LSEG
, ) modea b p
*.  Additionally, for each of the N integers c, was computed using SWR. 
For each algorithm, the total CPU time was recorded. 
modec q
 The platforms used vary widely in architecture and computing power. Below is 
the list of them: 
1) Lenovo T400 Laptop, Intel Core2 Duo CPU T9400 @2.53GHz with 3GB of 
RAM, Cygwin under Windows XP OS (32 bit). 
2) AMD Opteron Model 2218 @2.6 GHz Dual core, 8GB of RAM, RHEL Linux 
4.2 kernel 2.6.9 (64 bit). 
3) SunOS 5.10,  sun4u, Ultra-4, two UltraSPARC-II @ 296MHz processors, 1 GB 
of RAM (64 bit) 
As expected, the nominal running time varied widely among platforms, but the relative 
running times among the algorithms remained consistent. Below are the graphs of the 
results from the platform 2). For the sake of brevity the graphs for other platforms 
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Figure 2.11  Ratio of real running time of LSEG* over SWG. 
 




2.10 Algorithms for Finding Gaussian Generators 
 
Algorithm 2.2.3 and Algorithm 2.2.4 necessitate a way to find Gaussian integer 




Algorithm 2.10.1  Simple Algorithm for finding Gaussian Generators 
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1. Factor p2-1: 
 
1 22
1 21 ( ) ( ) ...( ) k
ee e
kp f f f− =  (2.130)
 
2. Select a G=(a,b) such that ,  and  0a > 0b > 2 2 (mod )a b p≠










If any of Bi=(1,0) mod p then G is not a generator, then go to Step 2. Otherwise, 
G is a generator. 
 
 Algorithm 2.10.1 is a straightforward extension of the most common algorithm 
for finding real integer generators and is based on Lagrange’s Theorem in the 
mathematics of group theory. It tests all the divisors of the largest period of a candidate to 
determine if it is a generator. Using the theoretical framework presented in Sections 2.3 
and 2.5, it was possible to design an improved algorithm to find Gaussian integer 




Algorithm 2.10.2  Norm Algorithm for finding Gaussian Generators 
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1. Factor  1
2








p f f f 1− =  (2.132)
 




2( 1) ( ) ( ) ...( ) kee e kp h h h+ = 2  (2.133)
 
3. Select a G=(a,b) such that ,  and  0a > 0b > 2 2 (mod )a b p≠
4. 
1







5. If go to Step 4. 2 | ( , ) | modr a b=
6. For each factor fi  of 
1
2














If any of b i= 1 mod p then G is not a generator, go to Step 3.  
7.  ( )21( , ) ( , ) modc d r a b p−=
8. For each factor hi of 2(p+1) compute Lucas sequence values .  ( 2 , 1
ih
V P c Q= =








 The relative efficiency of the algorithms would vary somewhat with the type of 
exponentiation algorithm used. However, it is clear that Algorithm 2.10.2 is much more 
efficient than Algorithm 2.10.1, as shown below.  
 Algorithm 2.10.1 performs the exponentiation of Gaussian integers. This means 
that it is possible to use similar time complexity analysis that was done is Section 2.8 for 
the SWG (Sliding Window Gaussian) algorithm. There are differences, however. In the 
analysis for (2.127), it was reasonable to assume that every exponent would be of 
average bit size 2n, where n is the bit size of prime p. For Algorithm 2.10.1, on the other 
hand, the exponent sizes would be different. 
SWGT
 Suppose size(x) stands for the size of integer x in bits (e.g., size(p)=n), then the 
sum of sizes of the factors of p2-1 from (2.130) is  
 
( ) ( )2
1






= − =∑  (2.135)
 
The size of each exponent of if  used in (2.131) is  
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where n = size(p), - time to multiply two real integer of size n, k – number of prime 




( )rt nβ . 
 The running time complexity analysis for of Algorithm 2.10.2 is similar to the 
time complexity analysis of LSEG. As with Algorithm 2.10.1, the size of the exponent is 





p −  in Step 2 and ( )2 1p +  in Step 3. It is worth noting that 
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=  (2.138) 
 
The purpose of this discussion is to show that Algorithm 2.10.2 is faster than Algorithm 
2.10.1. Because real integer exponentiation is much faster than Lucas sequences 
computation, it is permissible to presume, for simplicity, that real integer exponentiation 
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 From (2.140) it is clear that Algorithm 2.10.2 is always more than twice as fast as 
Algorithm 2.10.1, regardless of  or w β  (both  and w β  have to be greater than 0, of 
course). In reality though, Algorithm 2.10.2 is even faster, because the real integer 
exponentiation is much faster than the Lucas sequences computation for the same prime. 
(For simplicity, it was assumed that the real integer exponentiation had the same speed as 
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the Lucas sequences computation. This made the estimate for the speed of Algorithm 
2.10.2  appear higher.)  
 To find a real generator for p, p-1 has to be factored. To find a Gaussian 
Generator, both p-1 and p+1 have to be factored. One could argue that for large p it may 
be too hard to factor p-1 and p+1. Fortunately, for discrete logarithm based algorithms, 
very large prime factor of p-1 and p+1 are desired in order to protect against various 
attacks. If both p-1 and p+1 have large prime factors (close to the the bitsize of prime p), 
then factoring is easy. 
 
 
2.11 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter it was shown that there are no benefits to using non-Blum Gaussian primes 
in DLP-based Public Key (PK) cryptography algorithms because there is one-to-one 
relationship between Gaussian integers modulo non-Blum Gaussian primes and real 
integers. Consequently, the Gaussian integers considered for PK cryptosystems should be 
limited to primes , where p is a prime and ( ,0)P p= mod 4 3p = . This restriction allows 
for efficient implementation of MOD operation used for PK cryptosystems. 
 In Chapter 2, the properties of the Gaussian integer exponentiation are analyzed 
in-depth. Based on these properties, an improved algorithm to find a Gaussian integer 
generator is described (Algorithm 2.10.2, Norm Algorithm for finding Gaussian 
Generators). The speed of Algorithm 2.10.2 was compared to the speed of Algorithm 
2.10.1 (Simple Algorithm for finding Gaussian Generators). It was proven that Algorithm 
2.10.2 is always faster than Algorithm 2.10.1. Additionally, it was demonstrated that the 
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discrete logarithm for Gaussian integers can be computed by decomposing the Gaussian 
integer group into two subgroups and computing the discrete logarithm in each subgroup.  
 In Section 2.5, it was proven that the Gaussian integer DLP is equivalent to a 
combination of the Lucas sequences DLP and the real integer DLP. This fact means that 
the Gaussian integer DLP is harder than the real integer DLP, consequently, the PK 
cryptosystems based on Gaussian integers exponentiation modulo prime p that is n bits 
long is equivalent in security to a real integer PK DLP based cryptosystems modulo 
prime q which is 2n bits long.  
 Finally, based on the proof of the security of the Gaussian integer DLP in Section 
2.5, the exponentiation of Gaussian integers modulo prime p were compared to the 
exponentiation of real integers modulo prime q, where q is twice the size of p. Firstly, it 
was shown (both theoretically and experimentally) that under such settings the 
multiplication of Gaussian integers modulo p is about 20% for the bit range currently 
used for PK cryptosystems (1500+ bits). Secondly, a novel exponentiation algorithm for 
Gaussian integers was introduced in Section 2.8: Algorithm 2.8.1, Lucas sequence 
Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG).  It improves the speed by additional 18% 
(on top of 20% which results in about 34% over real integer exponentiation).  Moreover, 
some steps of the LSEG algorithm could be run in parallel (such version of LSEG 
algorithm was denoted as LSEG*). LSEG* offers about 52% theoretical improvement 
over real integer exponentiation.  
 Section 2.9 describes the experiments performed on various computing platforms 









3.1 Restriction of Gaussian Integer Domain 
To extend the Rabin algorithm, a subset of Z[i], as described in [27], is considered, 
namely, real primes p: p mod 4=3 or real Blum primes. This allows for the use of modulo 
(mod) operation as defined in Definition 1.3.2. The overhead of this mod operation is 
minimal. 
The rationale for the restriction of the domain is that the use of Gaussian primes 
 (or non-Blum Gaussian primes) leads to a less secure and 
inefficient algorithm. This point is discussed in-depth in Section 2.1. 
( , ) :| | mod 4 1P a b P= =
 
 
3.2 Rabin Cryptosystem 
Rabin Cryptosystem was proposed in 1979 by Michael O. Rabin. The high level 
description of the algorithm is below: 
Algorithm 3.2.1  Original Rabin Cryptosystem 
Key generation 





 Given message m: 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, Bob computes the ciphertext  
 
2 modc m n= . (3.1)
 
Decryption 
Given ciphertext c Alice computes square roots of c mod n using private keys p 
and q. Most of the time there are four square roots of c mod n. Very rarely there 
are two square roots of c mod n. Now Alice needs to determine which of the roots 
corresponds to the original message. 
 
Rabin Algorithm is sometimes referred to as a version of RSA algorithm. The 
security of this cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of the factorization problem. 
However, Rabin has many advantages over RSA. The encryption is much faster than 
RSA’s, while the decryption speed is comparable with RSA’s. It is proven to be as strong 
as factoring. If there are two square roots of c: x and y such that , then there are 
non-trivial factors of n by computing GCD(x+y,n). 
x n y≠ −
Ironically, this fact is also a major disadvantage of Rabin cryptosystem. It is easy 
to factor n if the two square roots of c: x and y such that x n y≠ −  are known. Using one 
of Rabin signature schemes or by some other means, Bob can ask Alice to decrypt 
ciphertext c and obtain the second root y with a probability ½. This is known as a chosen 
ciphertext attack. Another difficulty of Rabin cryptosystem is that Alice needs to figure 
out which square root corresponds to the message. 
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Both shortcomings of the Rabin can be addressed by adding redundant bits to the 
end of every message. One can also use zeros or any preset string of bits. These bits 
allow Alice to identify the correct square root. In addition, returning only the root 
corresponding to the encrypted message protects against the chosen ciphertext attack. 
There is still a possibility that even with redundancy, the Rabin machine would return an 
incorrect root. However, if enough redundant bits are used, the probability of this 
happening is very small. It is widely suggested that 64 bits is sufficient number of 
redundant bits [54]. In this case, the probability of an error is 2-64. 
 
 
3.3 Square Roots Modulo n=pq 
The decryption step requires Alice to take square root modulo n=pq. It is a three steps 
process: 
1)  take square root c mod p. There are two square roots : x1 and x2, where x2=p-x1
2) take square root c mod q. There are two square roots : y1 and y2 where y2=q-y1 
3) get four square roots m1,m2,m3,m4 of c (mod n) using Chinese Remainder 
Theorem (CRT) on pairs (x1,y1), (x1,y2), (x2,y1) and (x2,y2) 
 
1 1
1 1 1( mod ) ( mod )   (mod )m x q q p y p p q n
− −= + . (3.2)
 
1 1
2 1 2( mod ) ( mod )   (mod )m x q q p y p p q n





3 2 1( mod ) ( mod )   (mod )m x q q p y p p q n
− −= + . (3.4)
 
1 1
4 2 2( mod ) ( mod )   (mod )m x q q p y p p q n
− −= + . (3.5)
 
q (q-1 mod p)  (mod n) and p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) can be precomputed at the time of key 
generation.  
Another way to compute it is to find a and b satisfying ap + bq = 1, using the 
extended GCD algorithm. Then: 
 
1 1 1     (mod )m apx bqy n= + . (3.6)
 
2 1 1     (mod )m apx bqy n= − . (3.7)
  
3 1 1   (mod )m m n m n= − = − . (3.8)
 
 4 2 2   (mod )m m n m n= − = − . (3.9)
 
If primes p and q are Blum primes ( mod 4 3p =  and ), then the square 
roots from steps 1) and 2) are easy to compute: 




1 2mod ,  
p
1x c p x p
+






1 2mod ,  
p
y c p y p y
+
= = 1− . (3.11)
 
 
For non-Blum primes ( mod 4 1p =  and mod 4 1q = ) it is harder to compute the 
square roots. Even though it is possible to use non-Blum primes, it is much more 
practical to use Blum primes for the Rabin cryptosystem.   
 
 
3.4 Extended Square Root Algorithm mod p 
To extend the Rabin Cryptosystem to the domain of Gaussian integers, the square root 
algorithm was developed. As was already mentioned in Section 2.1, only the subset of 
Gaussian primes is considered: real primes p such that mod 4 3p =  (Blum primes). The 
algorithm is below:  
Algorithm 3.4.1  Extended Square root algorithm mod p 
Given:  H=c+di=(c,d) – Gaussian integer 
 p  – real Blum prime 
Computing:  S=(a,b) square root of H mod p  
 
 (1) if (d = 0)                
 (2)  x:= c(p+1)/4 (mod p);              
 (3)  if (x2=c) (mod p)     // square root of c exists         
 (4)   return { (x,0), (-x,0) };            
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 (5)  else        // square root of c doesn’t exist       
 (6)   return { (0,x), (0,-x) };            
 (7)  endif                
 (8) else                 
 (9)                   n:=|(c,d)| (p+1)/4 (mod p);            
(10)  if   (mod p)          // square root of |H| doesn’t exist    2( | ( , ) |n c d≠ )
(11)   return {};        // no square roots of H exists            
(12)  else               
(13)   t:= 2-1(c+n) (mod p);          
(14)   x:=t (p+1)/4 (mod p);          
(15)   if (x2=t) (mod p)    // square root of t exists         
(16)    a:=x;              
(17)    b:=(2a)-1d  (mod p);              
(18)    return {(a,b), (-a,-b)};           
(19)   else         // square root of t doesn’t exist       
(20)    b:=x;              
(21)    a:=(2b)-1d  (mod p);              
(22)    return {(a,b), (-a,-b)};           
(23)   endif               
(24)  endif                
(25) endif                
Note that 2-1 mod p is simply 1
2
p +  , since  
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12 1 1 (m
2
p p pod )+ = + = . (3.12)
 
A few simple theorems are needed to prove the validity of the algorithm and show 
how it was derived. 
  
Theorem 3.4.1 
H has a square root if and only if |H| has a square root (mod p) 
Proof: 
Suppose G: ord(G)=p2-1 is a generator and  H=Gk mod p.  
⇒  It is known that H has a square root and the aim is to prove that |H| has a square root. 
If H has a square root S and H=Gk mod p then k is divisible by 2. Looking at 
| | modH p : 
 
| | | | | | modk kH G G= = p . (3.13) 
 
Since k is divisible by 2, the square root of |H| exists and equals |G|k/2.   
⇐  It is known that |H| has a square root and the aim is to prove that H has a square root. 
Since the square root of |H| exists, then k is divisible by 2. From this directly follows 






If H=(c,0)  then: 
 1) H always has a square root S. 
 2) If a2=c mod p, then (a,0) and (-a,0) are the square roots of H. 
 3) If c does not have a square root, then (0,b), (0,-b) are the square roots of H, and     
 





1)    It is true that  
 
2| | | ( ,0) |  (modH c c p= = . (3.15)
 
This implies that the square root of |H| exists and equals to c. According to 
Theorem 3.4.1, square root of H must exist also. 
2) It is given than that H=(c,0) and c has a square root. From 1) it follows that 
there is a square root S=(a,b) of H mod p.  
 
H=(c,0)=(a2-b2, 2ab) and 2ab=0  (mod p) (3.16)
 
From the identity 
 
2ab = 0 mod p (3.17)
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follows that a or b must be 0. In addition, it is known that c= a2-b2 and c has a 
square root.  
Suppose a=0 mod p, then c=-b2.  From this follows that c does not have a 
square root. This is a contradiction because it is known that c has a square 
root. Consequently, the only possibility is that b=0 mod p and c=a2 mod p, 
thus (a,0) and (-a,0) are the only two square roots of H. 
3) It is given that H=(c,0) and c does not have a square root. From 1) it follows 
that there is a square root S=(a,b) of H mod p.  
 
H=(c,0)=(a2-b2, 2ab) and 2ab=0  (mod p). (3.18)
 
From 2ab = 0 mod p follows that a or b must be 0. In addition, it is 
known that c= a2-b2 and c does not have a square root. Suppose b=0 mod p, 
then  
 
c=a2 mod p. (3.19)
 
Therefore, c has a square root a mod p. This is a contradiction because it is 
known that c does not have a square root. Consequently, the only possibility is 
that a=0 mod p and c=-b2 mod p. Thus (0,b) and (0,-b) are the only two 
square roots of H. 





If H=(c,d),  and r and –r are square roots of |H| mod p, then:  0 modd ≠ p
1) There are exactly two square roots of H mod p:  S1=(a,b), S2=(-a,-b).  
   Neither a, nor b is 0.  
2) Either 
 
1 1{ 2 ( )  and (2 )  (mod )}a c r b a d− −= + = p . (3.20)
 
      or 
 










1 ( , 2 ) modS a b ab H= − = . (3.22)
 
S2=(-a,-b) is also a square root of H because  
 
2 2 2 2




1 1{ 2 ( )  and (2 )   (mod )}b c r a b d− −= − + = p
b
. (3.24)
         
2d a=  and 0d ≠  (mod p) (3.25)
 
implies that neither a, nor b is 0. Moreover, 1 2| | |S S |=  must also equal to 




2 2 moda b c− = . (3.26)
 
If , then  2r a b= +
 
1 1 2 2 2 2 22 ( ) 2 ( )  (mod )c r a b a b a p− −+ = − + + = . (3.27)
 
2  (mod )a p b is a or –a. For either a or –a  find b using 2d a= :    
   
1(2 )  (mod )b a d p−= . (3.28)
            
If  , then  2r a b= − − 2
 




2  (mod )b p b is b or –b. For either b or –b find a using 2d a= :    
  
1(2 )  (mod )a b d p−= . (3.30)
                   
Each of the possibilities 2r a b2= +  or 2r a b2= − −  (mod p) yields two square 
roots. Also note that only one of 12 ( )c r− +  or  12 ( )c r−− +  exists because 
 and   are opposites of each other. Consequently, there are 
exactly two square roots of H. 
12 ( )c r− + 12 ( )c r−− +
Q.E.D  
 
Note that on lines (17) and (21) of Algorithm 3.4.1 the modular inverse (2a)-1d  or 
(2b)-1d  (mod p) is needed. Before this the condition needs to be checked to make sure 
that neither a nor b equals to 0 mod p. Fortunately, this is easy to do. If S is in the form of 
(a,0) or (0,b), then H=S2 must be in the form of (c,0). This means that the only condition 
needed to be checked is: if d=0 mod p. If d=0 mod p, then Theorem 3.4.2 is applied to 
compute the Gaussian square roots of H=(c,0). Only one square root of a real integer is 
needed to do it. Lines (1)-(8) of Algorithm 3.4.1 handle to the case when d=0 mod p. 
 The rest of the algorithm (lines (8) to (25)) corresponds to the more general case 
when . The square root of |H| mod p is taken on lines (13) and (14). 
According to Theorem 3.4.1, the execution can stop if there is no square root of 
0 modd ≠ p
modH p  ( lines (10) and (12)). Otherwise, it must be true that the Gaussian square roots 
of H exist and Theorem 3.4.3 is used to compute them. 
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 The most computationally expensive operations in Algorithm 3.4.1 are the real 
integer square root operations. If H is in the form of (a,0), only one real integer square 
root operation is required. Otherwise, two real integer square root operations and one 
modular inverse operation are required. 
  
 
3.5 Extended Square Root Algorithm mod n=pq 
The algorithm for finding square roots modulo n= pq can be constructed by using 
Algorithm 3.4.1 together with CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem). 
Algorithm 3.5.1  Extended Square root algorithm mod n=pq 
Given:    p, q    - real Blum primes 
 n=pq   - product of p and q 
 H=(c,d)   mod n  - Gaussian integer 
Find:   All Si=(ai,bi) : Si2=H   (mod n) 
 
Step 1. Find the square root Sp=(ap,bp) of H (mod p) using Algorithm 3.4.1. If Sp does not 
exist stop, there is no square root (mod n) for H. 
Step 2. Find the square root Sq=(aq,bq) of H (mod q) using Algorithm 3.4.1. If Sq does not 
exist then stop, there is no square root (mod n) for H. 
Step 3. Reconstruct all different Si using CRT in the following way: 
 S1=(a1,b1) , where    




b1=bp  q (q-1 mod p) + bq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) (3.32)
   
 S2=(a2,b2), where  
a2=-ap  q (q-1 mod p) + aq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) (3.33)
  
b2=-bp  q (q-1 mod p) + bq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) (3.34)
 
 S3=(a3,b3) , where     
a3=-ap  q (q-1 mod p) - aq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) (3.35)
 
b3=-bp  q (q-1 mod p) - bq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) (3.36)
 
 S4=(a4,b4), where 
a4=ap  q (q-1 mod p) - aq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) (3.37)
    
b4=bp  q (q-1 mod p) - bq  p (p-1 mod q) (mod n). (3.38)
 
   q (q-1 mod p)   (mod n) (3.39)
 
  and 
p (p-1 mod q)  (mod n) (3.40)
 
can be precomputed. 
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There could be at most four distinct Si but it is possible to have one or two distinct 
Si. Another way to compute it is to find a and b satisfying  
ap  + bq = 1,   (3.41)
 
using the extended GCD algorithm: 
S1 = (ap Sp + bq Sq)       (mod n) (3.42)
 
S2 = (ap Sp - bq Sq)   (mod n) (3.43)
 
S3=- S1    (mod n) (3.44)
 
S4= -S2                   (mod n). (3.45)
 
 
3.6 Extended Rabin Cryptosystem 
Using the extended square root algorithm (Algorithm 3.5.1) the following algorithm can 
be formulated:  
 
Algorithm 3.6.1  Extended Rabin Cryptosystem 
Key generation 
Alice selects two distinct primes p and q and calculates n=pq. She publishes n as 





Given message ( )1 2,M m m= : 1 20 ,m m n 1≤ ≤ − , Bob computes the ciphertext   
 




and sends C to Alice. 
Decryption 
Given the ciphertext C Alice computes the square roots of C mod n using private 
keys p and q and Algorithm 3.5.1. Most of the time there are four square roots of 
C mod n. Very rarely there are two square roots of C mod n. Now Alice needs to 
determine which of the roots corresponds to the original message. 
 
To use the original Rabin algorithm Bob would have to break the large messages 
into blocks m1,m2,..mL such that 0 ≤ mi ≤ n − 1. With Algorithm 3.6.1, Bob would need to 
do the same thing. The only difference is that Bob would send two blocks at the time. 
 
 
3.7 Security of the Extended Rabin Cryptosystem 
It is clear that the Extended Rabin Algorithm (Algorithm 3.6.1) is as secure as the 
original Rabin algorithm (Algorithm 3.2.1).  If the adversary can compute find two 
square roots of such that 1 1 1 2 2 2: ( , ) and ( ,C S a b S a b= = 1S ≠ −  he/she can find non-




( )1 2gcd ,a a n+ , (3.47)
 
( )1 2gcd ,b b n+ , (3.48)
 




( )1 2gcd ,b b n−  (3.50)
 
1 2a a−  and 1 2b b−  here are absolute values. 
The Extended Rabin Algorithm, as the original, is vulnerable to a chosen 
ciphertext attack. In addition, there is still a problem of selecting the correct square root. 
As with the Original Rabin Algorithm, both problems can be addressed by adding preset 
bits to the end of every message. With Algorithm 3.6.1 the message M consists of two 
blocks m1 and m2. The redundant bits could be added to m1, m2 or both m1 and m2. The 
advantage of the Extended Rabin Algorithm is that only half as many bits per block are 
needed as with the Original Rabin Algorithm to achieve the same probability of returning 
the correct square root. For example, to achieve the probability of an error of 2-64, 32 
redundant bits per block are required. With the original 64 bits are required. 
 When the Rabin algorithm is used with redundant bits, the proof of equivalency to 
factoring is no longer valid. This means that Rabin Cryptosystem with redundant bits 
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may be easier to break than factoring. If this is the case, then Gaussian integers offer 
enhanced security because the order of Gaussian integers mod p is p2-1 as opposed to p-1 













3.8 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, an extension of the Rabin cryptosystem into the field of Gaussian integers 
was formulated. The extended cryptosystem employs a new square root algorithm for 
Gaussian integers, which is presented in Section 3.4 and proven. The Extended Rabin 
cryptosystem is at least as secure as the original Rabin Cryptosystem. When used with 




ANALYSIS OF RSA ALGORITHM OVER GAUSSIAN INTEGERS 
 
 
4.1 Description of RSA Algorithm over the Field of Gaussian Integers 
RSA is a widely used algorithm based on the difficulty of factoring a product of two 
primes. The original RSA algorithm over the field of real integers is presented below: 
Algorithm 4.1.1 Original RSA algorithm 
Key Generation: Generate two large distinct real primes p and q. Compute n=pq. 
Compute ( ) ( 1)( 1)n p qϕ = − − . Select a random integer e such that 1 ( )e nϕ< <  and 
gcd( , ( )) 1e nϕ = . Compute . The pair n and e is the public key, and d is 
the private key. 
1: mod (d e nϕ−= )
Encryption: Given a message m (represented as a real integer) compute the ciphertext 
. : modec m n=
Decryption: Compute the original message . :  mod dm c n=
 







Algorithm 4.1.2  RSA algorithm with Gaussian integers 
Key Generation: Generate two large Gaussian primes P and Q. Compute N=PQ. 
Compute ( ) ( ) ( )N P Qϕ ϕ ϕ= . Select a random integer e such that 1 (e N )ϕ< <  and 
gcd( , ( )) 1e Nϕ = . Compute . Pair N and e is a public key, and d is the 
private key. 
1 mod ( )d e Nϕ−=
Encryption: Given a message M (represented as a Gaussian integer) compute cipher text 
.  MOD eC M N=
Decryption: Compute the original message MOD dM C N= . 
 
 
4.2 Cryptanalysis of RSA Algorithm over the Field of Gaussian Integers 
Algorithm 4.1.2 is the same as in [30]. The notation was converted and a special system 
introduced in [30] to avoid negative integers was omitted. 
Suppose N=PQ, where P and Q are Gaussian primes. N is a public key known to 
everybody. If one can factor N, the cryptosystem is broken and it is possible to read all 
the messages. There are three possibilities: 
1) P=(p,0)  and |Q| mod 4=1 where p is a real Blum prime 
2) |P| mod 4=1 and |Q| mod 4=1 
3) P=(p,0)  and Q=(q,0) where p and q are real Blum primes. 
 
The first possibility is clearly not secure. If P=(p,0)  and Q=(a,b) then N=(ap,bp). 
To determine the factors of N one needs to find gcd( , )ap bp p= , where gcd( , ) 1a b = , 




Example 4.2.1  RSA with Gaussian primes of mixed type (small numbers) 
 P=(23,0), Q=(9,4),  
N=PQ=(23,0)(9,4)=(207,92) 
gcd(207,92) = 23 
 








It takes a fraction of a second to compute the factor of N in large prime example. 
Consequently, this combination of Gaussian primes should never be used in Algorithm 
4.1.2. 
In case 2), both P=(a,b) and Q=(c,d) are non-Blum Gaussian primes. The one-to-
one relationship between real primes and non-Blum Gaussian primes could be used. If in 
Algorithm 4.1.2 both P and Q are non-Blum Gaussian primes, then, after converting the 
Gaussian integers into real integers, the resulting algorithm is the original RSA algorithm 
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over real integers. For the examples below the numerical examples from [30] were 
considered to illustrate the point. 
 
Example 4.2.3  RSA with non-Blum Gaussian primes 
The original example from [30] has the following: 
Key generation: Suppose P=(533,162) and Q=(17,10)    (4.1) 
N=PQ=(7441,8084).         (4.2) 
( ) (| | 1)(| | 1) (310333-1)(389-1)=120408816N P Qϕ = − − =    (4.3)  
Select e = 56852657.        (4.4) 
1 -1mod ( ) 56852657 mod  120408816d e Nϕ−= = = 98072417  (4.5) 
The public key is N = (7441,8084); e = 56852657 
Encryption:  
 Suppose a plaintext M = (0,999) 
    (4.6) 
56852657MOD (0,999)  MOD (7441,8084)
(-1530,2765)




     (4.7) 98072417 MOD ( 1530,2765) (0,999)dM C N= = − =
To get the equivalent of real integer RSA protocol the numerical representation of I has 
to be computed. If  , then N a bi= + 0 (mod )a bi N+ = , where 1: modi ab N−= − . For 
this example,  or 7441+8084i. (7441,8084)N =
1  (-7441)8084 120712096*83312011




    (4.8) 
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To get the equivalent real integer RSA protocol the numerical representation of I has to 
be computed. If  , then N a bi= + 0 (mod )a bi N+ = , where 1: modi ab N−= − .  
For this example N=(7441,8084) or 7441+8084i. 
     (4.9) 
1  (-7441)8084 120712096*83312011




The equivalent real integer RSA protocol: 
Key generation: Set  p = |P| = |(533,162)| = 310333,              (4.10) 
         q = |Q| = |(17,10)| = 389              (4.11) 
n = |N| = |P||Q| = pq = |(7441,8084)| = 120719537.            (4.12) 
( ) (| |) ( ) (| | 1)(| | 1) ( 1)( 1)
(310333-1)(389 -1) 120408816
n N N P Q p qϕ ϕ ϕ= = = − − = − −
= =
=
            (4.13) 
Using the same keys e and d: 
 e = 56852657                  (4.14) 
1 -1mod ( ) 56852657 mod  120408816d e Nϕ−= = = 98072417           (4.15) 
Here the public key is n = 120719537; e = 56852657 
Encryption:  
 With the Gaussian integer protocol, the message is M = (0,999) = 999i. 
 Convert M to m as follows: 
999 999*90868181 116940532 mod  120719537m i= = =            (4.16) 
 In the Gaussian integer protocol: 
              (4.17) 
56852657
 MOD 





 There are several ways to get the corresponding c: 
1) Convert C to c using the conversion algorithm (Algorithm 2.1.1): 
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                       (4.18) 
 1530 2765 1530 2765*90868181
33162438(mod  120719537)
c i= − + = − + =
=
2) Use the integer exponentiation algorithm: 
                     (4.19) 
56852657
mod
116940532 33162438 (mod 120719537)
ec m n= =
= =
           Note that 33162438 MOD (7441,8084) = (-1530,2765)             (4.20) 
Decryption: 
 With the Gaussian integer protocol the message is: 
                (4.21) 98072417 MOD ( 1530,2765) (0,999)dM C N= = − =
 As with cipher text c, there are several ways to get the corresponding m: 
1) Convert M to m using the conversion algorithm (Algorithm 2.1.1): 
   m = 999i = 999*90868181 = 116940532 (mod 120719537)         (4.22) 
2) Use the integer exponentiation algorithm: 
                     (4.23) 
98072417
mod
33162438 116940532 (mod 120719537)
dm c n= =
= =
 Note that 116940532 MOD (7441,8084) = (0,999)              (4.24) 
 
From Example 4.2.3 several facts are clear: 
• If the adversary can break real integer RSA then he/she automatically can 
automatically break the corresponding Gaussian integer RSA. Consequently, 
when two non-Blum Gaussian primes are used for Algorithm 4.1.2 there is no 
added security. 
• Note that the cipher text with Gaussian RSA and the corresponding real integer 
RSA has the same number of digits (-1530+2765i vs. 33162438). This is not 
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surprising because the one-to-one relationship implies that on average the number 
of digits in Gaussian integers and the corresponding real integers would be the 
same. The argument that Gaussian integer RSA packs more information is wrong. 
In fact, if any of the message representation schemes are used (like redundancy) 
the amount of information packed into each message would be less with Gaussian 
RSA. 
• There is no need for “domain of validity” concept as described in [30]. The 
Gaussian integer modulo operation, if defined carefully, is not ambiguous. 
Negative values represent information. In fact, if the “domain of validity” is used, 
less information is packed into each message. 
 
It was demonstrated that, if two non-Blum Gaussian primes are used in Algorithm 
4.1.2, then there is one-to-one correspondence to real integer RSA. From this, one could 
derive a conclusion that the security of Gaussian integer RSA with two non-Blum primes 
is the same as with real integer RSA. However, this may not be the correct conclusion. In 
fact, it is likely that Gaussian integer RSA is less secure than the corresponding real 
integer RSA.  
The reason for this is that the problem of representing n=pq (p and q are large 
primes) as a sum of two integer squares is a hard problem when factors p and q are large 
and unknown. If n can be represented as 2n a b2= +  and 2n c d 2= +  where c n  and 
, then n can be factored easily by doing the following:  
a≠ −
c n b≠ −




( )( )  (mod )a bi c di e fi n+ + = +  (4.25)
 
2) Compute gcd(e,f). gcd(e,f) would equal to either p or q. 
If representing n as a sum of two squares were an easy problem, then the factoring 
of n would be an easy problem also. By using Algorithm 4.1.2 with two non-Blum 
Gaussian primes, a partial solution to the factoring problem is given away and, possibly, 
the entire solution. 
The method described above is a generalization of a method for factorization used 
by Fermat. It is based on an idea that, if there are known two integers x and y so that 
2 2 (mod )x y≡ n
( )
 holds, then it can be used for factoring of n=pq.  Details of the algorithm 
and proof are provided in [32] . 
Now the case when Blum Gaussian primes are used in Algorithm 4.1.2 is 
discussed. When primes P = (p,0) and Q = (q,0) (p and q are Blum real primes) are used 
in Algorithm 4.1.2, it becomes: 
Algorithm 4.2.1  RSA algorithm with Gaussian integers and Blum Gaussian primes 
Key Generation: Generate two large real primes p and q. Compute n=pq. 
Compute . Select a random integer e such that 12 2( ) ( 1)( 1)n p qϕ = − − e nϕ< <  and 
gcd( , ( )) 1e nϕ = . Compute . Pair n and e is a public key, and d is the 
private key. 
1 mod ( )d e nϕ−=
Encryption: Given a message 1 2( , )M m m= , where 11 m n≤ <  and , compute 
cipher text . Here “mod” operation on a Gaussian integer is as follows: if 
G=(a,b), then  
21 m n≤ <
:  mod eC M n=
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mod ( , ) mod ( mod , mod )G n a b n a n b= = n  (4.26)
 
Decryption: Compute the original message mod dM C n= .  
 
This algorithm is described in [28] and it is very similar to real integer RSA. 
However, there are differences. In Algorithm 4.2.1, e and d range from 1 to 
, as opposed to 2 2( ) ( 1)( 1)n p qϕ = − − ( ) ( 1)( 1)n p qϕ = − −  in Algorithm 4.1.1. The order 
of a Gaussian integer modulo n = pq (p and q are Blum real primes) is much larger than 
the order of a real integer modulo n. In fact, 
 
2 2ord( ) mod lcm( 1, 1)G n p q≤ − −  (4.27)
 
as opposed to  
 
ord( ) mod lcm( 1, 1)g n p q≤ − −  (4.28)
 
where G is a Gaussian integer, g is a real integer.  
The primes p and q could be selected such that ord(G) mod n would equal to  
 
2 2( 1)( 1
24
p q )− −  (4.29)
 
However, larger order does not necessarily mean greater security for the RSA. 
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Currently, RSA is not proven to be as secure as factoring, although many 
scientists believe that it is likely the case. If it is the case, then Algorithm 4.2.1 is as 
secure as Algorithm 4.1.2. On the other hand, if breaking the RSA is not as hard as 
factoring, then it is possible that Gaussian integers add security to the RSA.  
At first glance, it seems that the message in Algorithm 4.2.1 packs more 
information than the message in Algorithm 4.1.2. However, it is incorrect. Sending one 
message with Algorithm 4.2.1 is equivalent to sending two messages with Algorithm 
4.1.1 as far as network bandwidth is concerned. Moreover, it takes longer to encrypt a 
Gaussian integer message than to encrypt two real integer messages. In Algorithm 4.2.1, 
in order to encrypt or decrypt, the following operation has to be performed: 
 
Gk mod n, (4.30)
 
where G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer, and 2 21 ( 1)(k p q 1)< < − − . 
It takes three real integer multiplications and several real integer additions to do 
one the Gaussian integer multiplication.  It takes two real integer multiplications and 
several real integer additions to do one the Gaussian integer square. The integer 
multiplication is much more time consuming than the integer addition so the additions 
will be ignored in the subsequent analysis.  When using the square-and-multiply 




( 1)( 13.5 log
2m




where tm is the time required for multiplication of two real integers. 
To encrypt or decrypt a message with the real integer RSA the following operation has to 
be performed: 
 
gm mod n , (4.32)
 
where g is a real integer and 1 ( 1)(m p q 1)< < − −  
The time required to perform two integer exponentiation operations is: 
 
2 2
( 1)( 13 log
2m
p qt t )− −=  (4.33)
 
No additions are necessary for real integer exponentiation operation. Clearly, . It 
takes less time to encrypt or decrypt two real integer messages than one Gaussian integer 
message. Consequently, Algorithm 4.2.1 does not have any advantages as far as 
encryption or decryption time of a given amount of data is concerned. The example 
below demonstrates this point. 
1t t> 2
 
Example 4.2.4  Algorithm 4.2.1 vs. Algorithm 4.1.1  
Key generation: Suppose p=251, q=263 
n = pq = 66013                 (4.34) 
2 2 2 2( ) ( 1)( 1) (251 -1)(263 -1)=4357584000n p qϕ = − − =             (4.35) 
Choose e = 56852657, then 
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1 -1mod ( ) 56852657 mod  4357584000d e Nϕ−= = = 1716163793           (4.36) 
The public key is n = 66013;e = 56852657 
Encryption:  
Let message M = (m1,m2) = (55555,44444) 
            (4.37) 
56852657
1 2( , )  mod (55555,44444)  mod 66013 =
= (31754,12046)
eC c c M n= = =
Decryption: 
             (4.38) 
1716163793
 MOD 
(31754,12046) mod 66013 (55555,44444)
dM C N= =
= =
The corresponding real integer RSA: 
Key generation: p=251, q=263 
n = pq = 66013 
( ) ( 1)( 1) (251-1)(263-1) 65500n p qϕ = − − = =              (4.39) 
To get e, reduce e mod ( )nϕ or mod 65500: 
e = 56852657 mod 65500 = 64157               (4.40) 
To get d, reduce d mod ( )nϕ or mod 65500: 
d = 1716163793 mod 65500 = 63793               (4.41) 
Note that 63793*64157=1 mod 65500 
The public key is n = 66013; e = 64157 
Encryption:  
In the corresponding Gaussian RSA, the message was M=(m1,m2)=(55555,44444) 
Encrypt m1 and m2 separately as follows: 
              (4.42) 641571 1 mod 55555 mod 66013 61927
ec m n= = =
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              (4.43) 641572 2 mod 44444 mod 66013 22993
ec m n= = =
Decryption: 
Decrypt m1 and m2 separately as follows: 
              (4.44) 637931 1 mod 61927 mod 66013 55555
dm m n= = =
              (4.45) 637932 2 mod 22993 mod 66013 44444
dm m n= = =
 
Example 4.2.4 illustrates that Algorithm 4.2.1 and Algorithm 4.1.1 have 
approximately the same performance when encrypting and decrypting the same amount 
of data.  In fact, as was proved before, the original RSA over real integers would be 
slightly faster.  
The extension of RSA the algorithm into the field of Gaussian integers 
(Algorithm 4.2.1) is viable only if real primes : mod 4 3p p =  are used (Algorithm 4.2.1). 
The extended algorithm could add security only if breaking the original RSA is not as 
hard as factoring. Even in this case, it is not clear whether the extended algorithm would 
increase security. The Gaussian integer RSA is slightly less efficient than the original; 




4.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, it is shown that the extension of the RSA algorithm into the field of 
Gaussian integers is viable only when real primes p: p mod 4 = 3 are used. The extended 
algorithm could add security only if breaking original RSA is not as hard as factoring. 
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Even in this case, it is not clear if the extended algorithm would increase security. The 
Gaussian integer RSA is slightly less efficient than the original; therefore, the original 




A PSEUDO-RANDOM PIXEL REARRANGEMENT ALGORITHM BASED 
ON GAUSSIAN INTEGERS FOR IMAGE WATERMARKING 
 
5.1 Algorithm Introduction 
Steganography is a process of hiding information in a medium in such a manner that no 
one except the anticipated recipient knows of its existence ([61]). The history of 
steganography can be traced back to around 440 B.C.E, where the Greek historian 
Herodotus described in his writings about two events: one used wax to cover secret 
messages, and the other used shaved heads. With the explosion of internet as a carrier for 
various digital media, many new directions of this state-of-the-art emerged.  
A notable application of steganography is watermarking of digital images, which 
is a useful tool for identifying the source, creator, owner, distributor, or authorized 
consumer of a document or an image. It has become very easy nowadays to copy or 
distribute digital images (whether copyrighted or not). A watermark is a pattern of bits 
inserted into a digital media for copyright protection ([12]). There are two kinds of 
watermarks: visible and hidden. A good visible watermark must be difficult for an 
unauthorized person to remove and can resist falsification. Since it is relatively easy to 
embed a pattern or a logo into a host image, the authorized person must make sure the 
visible watermark was indeed the one inserted by the author. In contrast, a hidden 
watermark is embedded into a host image by some sophisticated algorithm and is 
invisible to the naked eye. It could, however, be extracted by a computer.  
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There are many innovating watermarking algorithms and many more get 
published every day (such as recently published [3, 41, 53, 70] ). In many image 
watermarking algorithms, for example in [24, 69, 72, 73], it is required to rearrange the 
pixels as a part of watermarking process. Randomness is desired during this step. 
 Modular arithmetic and, specifically, the integer exponentiation modulo prime 
numbers are widely used in modern cryptographic algorithms. One important property of 
integer exponentiation modulo prime is that it generates a sequence of integers that looks 
very much like a sequence of random numbers. This is a property that is desirable for 
pixel rearrangement algorithms. In this dissertation, the rearrangement step of 
watermarking algorithms is revisited and a different universal method for doing it is 
described. It is easy to replace rearrangement step in  [24, 69, 72, 73] with the method 
described in this chapter. Moreover, this method can be used with most picture 
watermarking algorithms to enhance them.  
One can look at Gaussian integers as an extension of real integers into two 
dimensions. They exhibit similar properties as regular integers but have some notable 
differences, that could be exploited in various fields, such as cryptography [27, 28, 30, 
65]. One important difference is that they have a larger order for the same prime size, 
which provides the increased security.  
In [69, 72], Arnold’s cat map ([10]) was used to rearrange pixels for improving 
the performance of watermarking techniques. Here a replacement is described, namely, a 
novel pixel rearrangement algorithm based on Gaussian integers, to rearrange pixels in an 
image. It is demonstrated that the new algorithm is superior to Arnold’s cat map in both 
time complexity and security. This technique is not a watermarking algorithm by itself 
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but rather a universal enhancement to any existing watermarking algorithms. The 
technique tends to increase robustness to noise by uniformly distributing noise 
throughout the image. The increase in robustness depends on the watermarking algorithm 
enhanced by the technique. 
 
 
5.2 Proposed Pixel Rearrangement Algorithm 
In this section the algorithms for pixel rearrangement are introduced and their 
computational complexity analyzed.  
Algorithm 5.2.1  Pixel rearrangement based on Gaussian integers 
Given: Image I = (x, y) of size m × n; 
Output: Image ( , )I x y′ ′= ′
n
 of size m × n; 
 
1. Generate a prime and max( , )p m> mod 4 3p = . 
2. Find a Gaussian integer generator ( , ) modG a b p= , using Algorithm 2.10.1 or 
Algorithm 2.10.2.  
3. Generate a random number s, such that 20 1s p< < − . 
4.          (5.1) ( , ) : modsx yS s s G= = p
5. while (  or ) xs m> ys n>
6.   : modS SG p=
7. end-while  
8.  1 2( , ) :C c c S= =
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9. for i=1 to m 
10.                for j=1 to n 
11.   { } { }1 2' , : ,I c c I i j=                    (5.2) 
12.                      (5.3) : modC CG p=
13.                    while or1c m>   2c m>
14.     : modC CG p=                   (5.4) 
15.                   end-while 
16.              end-for 
17. end-for 
 
Note that the last value of 1 2( , )C c c= needs to be saved in order to rearrange back the 
pixels. Without the value of C, pixels could be rearranged back; however, it would 
require additional computation. 
 
Algorithm 5.2.2  Reverse of Algorithm 5.2.1 
1.                       (5.5) :rC C=
2. for i=m downto 1 
3.                             for j=n downto 1 
4.     { } { }1 2, : ' ,I i j I c c=       (5.6) 
5.           (5.7) 1: mor rC C G
−= d p
6.                                            while ( or1c m>  ) 2c m>
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7.                       (5.8) 1: mor rC C G
−= d p
8.                                            end-while 
9.                             end-for 
10. end-for 
 
The time complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1 and Algorithm 5.2.2 can be defined in 
terms of p. The most computationally expensive operations of the algorithm are (5.1), 
(5.7)  and (5.8). Suppose that u is the time spent to multiply two integers of size p. 
Assuming the square-and-multiply algorithm is used for exponentiation and Algorithm 




2 23.5 log ( 1) 7 logu p u− ≈ p  . (5.9)
 
Because the order of Gaussian integers is 2 1p − , in Step 4 of Algorithm 5.2.1, 2 1p −  
multiplications are performed. Therefore, the number of multiplications required is: 
 
( )( ) ( )2 23 1 3u p upΟ − = Ο . (5.10)
 
The total time complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1 is: 
 
( )( ) ( )2 223 1 7 logu p u p upΟ − + = Ο  (5.11)
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The complexity of integer multiplication u depends on the size of p. For small p, 
the most efficient algorithm is the naïve multiplication with time complexity of , 
where  is the size of p in bits. For a larger p, the multiplication algorithm in 
[43] is faster than the naïve method. The time complexity of the Karatsuba multiplication 
is . For an even larger p, the Toom-Cook (or Toom-3) algorithm is more 
efficient with a time complexity of  [44]. The thresholds for the size of p vary 
widely with implementation details. However, it is reasonable to assume that most 
images would not be sufficiently large for the Toom-Cook or Karatsuba multiplication. 








( ) ( )22 2logup p p⎡ ⎤Ο = Ο⎣ ⎦ . (5.12)
 
This is the time complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1. The time complexity for Algorithm 5.2.2 
is the same. 
To minimize the time complexity, it is reasonable to select p close to . If 
p is selected in such a way, then the time complexity in terms of image size is 
max( , )m n
 
( ) ( )( ){ }22max , log max ,m n m n⎡ ⎤Ο ⎣ ⎦ . (5.13)
 
The rearrangement algorithm described above is universal and can be used for 
many purposes. It can be applied for image watermarking as follows: 
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Algorithm 5.2.3  Watermarking with pixel rearrangement based on Gaussian integers 
1. Rearrange the image using Algorithm 5.2.1; 
2. Apply the desired watermarking technique to the resulting rearranged image 
from Step 1; 
3. Apply Algorithm 5.2.2 to the resulting image from Step 2. 
 
Algorithm 5.2.4  Extraction of the watermark applied with Algorithm 5.2.3 
1. Rearrange the image using Algorithm 5.2.1. 
2. Extract the watermark using the watermarking extraction technique in 
Algorithm 5.2.2. 
 
Note that in Algorithm 5.2.2, depending on watermarking technique, it may be 
possible to extract watermark and perform rearrangement on the watermark rather than 
on the image. 
 
 
5.3  Cryptoimmunity of the Rearrangement Algorithm 
From the properties of Gaussian integer group, it can be estimated how hard it is for an 
adversary to obtain the original image from the rearranged one. The less an adversary 
knows about the algorithm and parameters, the harder it is to determine the original 




Case 1. The adversary knows nothing about the rearrangement algorithm used, but he/she 
suspects that some kind of an algorithm has been used. In this case, it is extremely hard 
for an adversary to figure out the original arrangement because there are too many 
possibilities. That is, there are  possible permutations; where n is the number of pixels 
in the image.  
!n
 
Case 2. The adversary knows that Algorithm 5.2.1 was used, but he/she does not know 
the parameters such as prime p, generator G, or private key s. In this case, the number of 
possible permutations for an image I of size m × n is: 
 
( ) ( )2 21 1p pϕ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ , (5.14)
 
whereϕ  is the Euler’s totient function ([2]).  
The formula  (5.14) does not include the complexity of guessing p. The reason for 
this is that it is too computationally expensive to use a large p (refer to (5.12)). For 
efficiency, p should be close to the image size. The prime p in (5.14) can be selected in 
such a way that ( )2 1pϕ − is maximized. To do this, one can select a prime with large 
prime divisors of p + 1 and 1p − . For example,  
 
1 11p s q+ =  (5.15)
 
and   
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2 21p s q− = , (5.16)
 
where and are small integers, and and are primes close to p in size. In this case: 1s 2s 1q 2q
 






( )( ) ( )2 21 2 1 21 ( 1)( 1) ( ) (p q q q q pο ϕ ο ο ο− = − − = =  (5.18)
 
Consequently, the approximate computational complexity of (5.14) is: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )42 2 41 1 ( ) max ,p p p mο ϕ ο ο⎡ ⎤− − = =⎣ ⎦ n  (5.19)
 
Case 3. The adversary knows Algorithm 5.2.1 used, prime p, and a generator G. In this 
case, the number of possible permutations is limited to  
 
2 1p − .  (5.20)
 
While it may be unreasonable to assume that the adversary would not know 
Algorithm 5.2.1, there is no reason to make a prime p and a generator G known. 
Therefore, case 2 may be the most reasonable security estimate. 
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If increased protection is desired, Algorithm 5.2.1 could be applied several times 
on the same image. Suppose that Algorithm 5.2.1 was applied t times on image I of size 
m × n. In this case, the number of possible permutations is: 
 
( )( )4max , tm nο , (5.21)
 
while the time to compute the  rearranged image would still be reasonable and be on the 
same order in terms of image size: 
 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }2 22 2max , log max , max , log max ,t m n m n m n m nΟ = Ο⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . (5.22)
 
Therefore, one can achieve the desired level of security by increasing the time it takes to 




5.4 Comparison to Arnold’s Cat Map Chaos Transformation 







y l l y
′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤





where N is the width of the square image. The possible values of l in (5.23) are 
. Therefore, the number of the transformations required is O(N). It is 
reasonable to assume that N is small enough to call for the naïve multiplication 
algorithms. Thus, the multiplication time complexity is 
:1 2l l N< < −
 
2
2(log )NΟ , (5.24)
 
and it has to be performed for every pixel (i.e., N2 times). Therefore, the time complexity 
of Arnold’s Cat Map is: 
 
3 2




Formula (5.25) should be compared with (5.13), assuming max( , )N m≈ . It is obvious 
that the computational complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1 described by (5.13) is much better 
than that of Arnold’s Cat map described by (5.25). 
As far as security, it is obvious that there are only ο  possible permutations 
because  . It is much smaller than 
( )N
:1 2l l N< < − ( )( )4ο max ,m n  for Algorithm 5.2.1.  
Another important advantage of Algorithm 5.2.1 is that the transformed image 
does not have any visible patterns. After rearrangement with this the algorithm, the 
resulting image looks like random noise. The transformation with Arnold’s Cat map, on 
the other hand, preserves visible patterns. Figure 5.1 clearly illustrates this point. At 
every step of Arnold’s Cat map transformation, C1-C7 patterns are clearly visible. The 
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image B, on the other hand, looks like random noise. Consequently, Algorithm 5.2.1, 












Figure 5.1  Image rearranged by Algorithm 5.2.1 and Arnold’s Cat map side-by-side. A 
is the original image, B is the rearranged image by Algorithm 5.2.1, and C1-C7 are the 
steps of Arnold’s Cat map rearrangement. 
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5.5  Example in Image Watermarking 
Algorithm 5.2.1 can be used with general watermarking techniques. The following 
example illustrates its use of applying LSB substitution for watermark. Even though this 
technique does not provide a robust watermark, the use of rearrangement does improve 
the security by making the watermark virtually undetectable. When pixel rearrangement 
is used and the adversary looks at the last two bits of the watermarked image, all he/she 
sees is random noise. The only way to see the watermark is to rearrange the pixels. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the advantages of using the rearrangement algorithm for 
image watermarking. In Figure 5.2, (a) is the original Cameraman image, (b) is the two 
most significant bits of the Lena image to used as the watermark, (c) is the rearranged 
image of Cameraman using Algorithm 5.2.1, (d) is the watermarked image of the 
rearranged image using LSB substitution, (e) is the rearranged back of the preceding 
watermarked image using Algorithm 5.2.2, (f) is the extracted two bits of LSB, and (g) is 
the rearranged back of the preceding extracted image using Algorithm 5.2.2. Note that 
image (g) is exactly the same as the original watermark (b). 
 If the watermarking is performed without rearrangement, then the hidden 
watermark is easily detectible. By using the proposed algorithms, it is impossible to see 
the original watermark in image (f), which is random noise just like images (c) and (d). It 
is fairly difficult for the adversary to extract the original watermark, even though her/she 
knows that the watermark is hidden there. With sequential applications of Algorithm 
5.2.1, the security could be enhanced to an arbitrary level, making watermark practically 
impossible to reconstruct for the adversary. 
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           (a)       (b)    (c) 
     
      (d)       (e)     (f)        
 
      (g) 
 
Figure 5.2 (a) The original Cameraman image, (b) the two most significant bits of Lena 
as the watermark, (c) the rearranged image of Cameraman using Algorithm 5.2.1, (d) the 
watermarked image of the rearranged image using LSB substitution, (e) the rearranged 
back of the preceding watermarked image using Algorithm 5.2.2, (f) the extracted two 





5.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a new method of rearranging image pixels for watermarking based on the 
properties of Gaussian integers is described. It results in a random-looking image 
transformation that significantly improves the security of the embedded watermark. 
Moreover, it is much faster when compared to Arnold cat map. The proposed algorithm is 
an easy-to-implement practical technique that would enhance the security of any 






The application of Gaussian integers for DLP based public key cryptosystems was 
discussed. It was demonstrated that cryptosystems that are based on non-Blum Gaussian 
primes (primes  is a prime) are equivalent to real integer cryptosystems 
modulo  (Algorithm 2.1.1 and Algorithm 2.1.2). Therefore, such cryptosystems do 
not offer any advantages over real integer cryptosystems. On the other hand, the 
cryptosystems based on Blum Gaussian primes (primes
( , ) :| |P a b P=
| P |
( , 0)P p= : p is a prime) offer a 
longer cycle. 
It was shown that the Gaussian integer DLP is substantially harder then the real 
integer DLP. Moreover, when solving the Gaussian integer DLP, one is required to solve 
two problems: 
1) Lucas Sequences DLP with 1modQ p≡ (Theorem 2.5.2). 
2) Real integer DLP. 
The fact that these two problems seem to be very different, bodes very well for 
cryptography algorithms based on the Gaussian integer DLP. The solution of one 
problem may not lead to the solution of the other, so Gaussian integers offer additional 
protection.  
 In addition to allowing for assessing the complexity of the Gaussian integer DLP, 
Theorem 2.5.2 is the basis for Algorithm 2.8.1 (Lucas sequence Exponentiation of 
Gaussian integers (LSEG)). The LSEG algorithm achieves about 35% theoretical 
improvement in CPU time over real integer exponentiation. Under an implementation 
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with GMP 5.0.1 library it outperformed the GMP’s "mpz_powm" function (the 
particularly efficient modular exponentiation function that comes with GMP library) by 
40% for bit sizes 1000-4000, because of low overhead associated with LSEG. Moreover, 
some steps of the LSEG algorithm could be run in parallel (such version of the LSEG 
algorithm was denoted as LSEG*). LSEG* offers about 50% improvement over real 
integer exponentiation. 
 In this dissertation, the properties of Gaussian integers under modular 
multiplication and exponentiation were explored. Specifically, the order of Gaussian 
integers and its relationship to their norm was analyzed. Based on the relationship 
between the order and the norm, an efficient and practical algorithm to find generators for 
the Gaussian integer DLP cryptosystems was designed, namely, Algorithm 2.10.2. 
In addition to DLP based cryptosystems, the factoring based cryptosystems with 
Gaussian integers were considered (i.e., RSA and Rabin). The Extended Square Root 
algorithm for Gaussian integers was derived and its validity proved. Using this algorithm 
the Rabin Cryptography algorithm was extended into the field of Gaussian integers. The 
resulting Extended Rabin Cryptography algorithm requires only half as many redundant 
bits as the original.  
The analysis was performed on the extension of RSA into the domain of Gaussian 
integers. It yielded several interesting results, namely, that Gaussian primes 
do not offer any immediately tangible advantages over real primes and 
that the viability of Gaussian integer RSA is questionable. 
( , ), 0P a b b= ≠
Finally, a novel algorithm to rearrange the image pixels for image watermarking 
was derived. The new algorithm is much more efficient than Arnold’s Cat map and it 
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provides a degree of cryptoimmunity to the watermarks. The proposed method can be 
used with most picture watermarking algorithms to enhance them.  
The work presented in this dissertation can be extended in many directions 
including: 
1. Improving the running time of LSEG (Algorithm 2.8.1 ) 
2. Improving the performance of extended Rabin cryptosystem 
3. Improving the security of the pixel rearrangement algorithm (Algorithm 
5.2.1) 
There are many other ways to extend research, but the abovementioned points seem to be 
the most promising. 
 Any improvement to the LSEG algorithm would mean an improvement in the 
running time of the Gaussian integer DLP based cryptosystems. Arguably, there is a lot 
of room for improvement. The slowest operation in the algorithm is the computation of 
Lucas sequences. Any improvement to the computation time of Lucas sequences would 
improve the performance of LSEG. The analysis in this dissertation used the algorithm 
published in [74]. It is analogous to square-multiply exponentiation for real integers. The 
algorithms published in [18] and [68] improve the running time of [74], however, it can 
probably be improved further. Moreover, any improvement to real integer exponentiation 
algorithms would improve the performance of LSEG. 
 The extended Rabin cryptosystem with Gaussian integers is not faster than real 
integer for the same amount of data. It is likely that the increase in number of dimensions 
in this case could be beneficial i.e., the extended Rabin algorithm with quaternions could 
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be faster than the original, provided that the square root for quaternions can be done with 
less than four integer exponentiations. 
 In all probability, the pixel rearrangement algorithm (Algorithm 5.2.1) can be 
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